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Abstract
We study the impact of simplification, deterrence and tax morale on tax compli-
ance. We ran five natural field experiments varying the communication of the tax
administration with the universe of income taxpayers in Belgium throughout the tax
process. A consistent picture emerges across experiments: (i) simplifying communi-
cation substantially increases compliance, (ii) deterrence messages have an additional
positive effect, (iii) invoking tax morale is not effective, and often backfires. A discon-
tinuity in enforcement intensity, combined with the experimental variation, allows us
to compare simplification with standard enforcement measures. We find that simpli-
fication is far more cost-effective, allowing for substantial savings on enforcement costs.
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1 Introduction
Tax compliance sits at the heart of the healthy functioning of societies. It is therefore of little
surprise that gaining a robust understanding of the drivers of tax compliance is an important
topic in the economics literature. Tax compliance involves both the truthful reporting of
taxable income and the timely payment of tax dues. The growth in third-party reporting of
income has limited the ability to misreport income (see Kleven et al. (2011, 2016); Jensen
(2019)).1 Tax administrations, however, continue to devote considerable resources to the
collection of taxes. In the United States the annual cost of non-compliance with individual
income taxes due to nonfiling, underreporting, and underpayment is estimated to total about
$319 billion (Internal Revenue Service, 2016). Closing the “tax gap” is a key objective for
governments around the world, and requires to know the drivers of tax compliance and the
cost effectiveness of further interventions (OECD, 2010; HM Revenue & Customs, 2018).
The classic work by Allingham and Sandmo (1972) provided a work-horse model for un-
derstanding tax compliance through pecuniary incentives that deter non-compliance. Since
then, a large body of research has stressed the role of non-pecuniary motives more broadly
(e.g., Kirchler (2007); Luttmer and Singhal (2014); Besley et al. (2019)), often referred to as
tax morale. There is now scattered evidence for these different drivers of tax compliance to
be important across a variety of settings (see Slemrod (2018)), but several questions remain
unanswered. In particular, while information frictions and complexity are shown to be im-
portant in related contexts (e.g., Bhargava and Manoli (2015); Cox et al. (2018)), their role
in the context of tax compliance is less understood.
This paper studies the simplification of the communication by the tax authority and
compares its impact on tax compliance to, on the one hand, the use of deterrence and tax
morale nudges and, on the other hand, the use of standard enforcement measures. We
study compliance effects throughout the tax process – including the timing of tax filing,
the reporting of taxable income, and the payment of taxes – for all individuals subject to
personal income taxation in Belgium. We compare the potential drivers of tax compliance
in the same context and put them on equal footing by varying the content of the tax letters
sent by the Belgian tax authority (Federal Public Service Finance, FPS Finance). In total,
we ran five population-wide natural field experiments in collaboration with the FPS Finance
over the course of three fiscal years, 2014-2016. This comprehensive approach allows us to
replicate findings at different stages of the tax process and across fiscal years, and to estimate
longer-term, repetition and interaction effects.
1Recent empirical work investigates the misreporting of foreign income in developing countries (e.g.,
Alstadsæter et al. (2018)) and of taxable income in developing countries (e.g., Pomeranz (2015); Naritomi
(2018)) where paper trails are missing or the enforcement capacity falls short.
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The standard communication from the tax administration to taxpayers consists of a
request to file a tax return and a request to pay taxes. Follow-up correspondence takes
place in the event of taxpayers being late either in filing their tax return or in paying their
tax dues. In order to estimate the impact of simplification and compare it to the use of
deterrence or the appeal to tax morale, we leverage the different phases of communication and
simultaneously test a variety of treatments. The simplification treatments shorten the length
of the letters, reduce the information overload and highlight the action-relevant information
to the taxpayer. The deterrence treatments add a message to the simplified letter that
makes the financial penalties explicit and/or highlight the enforcement actions in case of
non-compliance. The tax morale treatments add a message that highlights the public good
value of tax expenditures and/or the social norms attached to filing and paying taxes on
time.
Our experiments provide precise and remarkably consistent results across the tax process
and the respective samples of taxpayers addressed. We find the largest compliance effects for
the simplification treatments. Simplified tax filing reminders increase subsequent tax filing
by 8% (relative to the baseline reminder). Simplifying the tax letter sent to all taxpayers with
a positive tax bill increases timely payment by 0.7%.2 For the late tax payers, the simplified
reminder increases subsequent tax payment by as much as 23% (relative to the baseline
reminder). Reducing information overload and emphasizing action-relevant information seem
particularly effective in increasing compliance. We find that adding tax deterrence messages
further increases tax compliance, with the average effect often being comparable in magnitude
to the effect of simplification. Tax payers are successfully induced to comply by making
potential penalties and their enforcement explicit, and by the encouragement to pay or file
immediately to avoid these penalties. In contrast, treatments that seek to improve tax
morale obtain no compliance effects and sometimes even backfire. The ineffectiveness of tax
morale messages is replicated across all treatments arms, which include messages that invoke
social norms and/or emphasize the social value of public expenditures. For the latter, we
also experiment with a pop-up pie chart of government expenditures for online tax filers and
find that it does not affect reported taxable income, but neither does it affect the perceived
importance of honesty as measured in an endline survey. While the survey shows that the
treatment does increase taxpayers’ knowledge and appreciation of public services, this seems
insufficient to increase tax compliance.
More timely tax payments do not necessarily translate into greater tax revenues. In par-
ticular, we study the full dynamics of the treatment effects on late payers, and find that they
2Despite tax withholding one out of three taxpayers has a positive outstanding balance on their tax bill,
adding up to a total of 3.8 billion euros in 2016 (about 10 percent of personal income taxes).
3
diminish over time as the tax administration takes further enforcement measures (including
imposing garnishments and sending bailiffs) to eventually reach close to full compliance.
The simplification treatment effects at the end of the tax cycle are 1.0pp, which is ten times
smaller than their effect at the payment deadline. Still, the cost savings on follow-up en-
forcement imply a large return to the simplification treatment. We exploit an enforcement
discontinuity, combined with our experimental variation, to disentangle their respective ef-
fects. We estimate that the simplification treatment would have increased compliance by
5.2pp in the absence of enforcement actions, and that it is six times more cost-effective than
standard enforcement.
Our empirical setting thus allows us to push the frontier on the evaluation of letter
treatments by comparing their compliance effects to standard enforcement actions. While
nudges are by definition low-cost interventions, knowing how they compare to the standard
policy levers that they complement has been a key challenge (Benartzi et al., 2017). The
enforcement discontinuity allows us to compare the causal impact of regular enforcement
interventions and the experimental letter treatments for the exact same people (i.e., late
taxpayers around the enforcement threshold). Projected on the sample of late taxpayers,
whose tax liability was about e434 million, a back-of-the envelope calculation tells us that
the simplification treatment for this experiment alone could have increased tax collection
by e17.5 million, or alternatively, amounted to savings on enforcement costs worth e5.4
million. In comparison, the costs of the nudge intervention were trivial (e79,511).
Our experimental design also allows us to tackle a second important concern for the
evaluation of letter interventions and nudge interventions more generally, which is whether
the gains are long-lived (Allcott and Rogers, 2014; Cronqvist et al., 2018). To that purpose,
we repeated the experiment on the late taxpayers in two consecutive years. We first find
that there are no diminishing marginal returns to repeating the treatment in that recidivists
are equally responsive to a simplified letter independent of the letter type they received in
the previous year. Moreover, we find that the effects extend to the following fiscal year:
late payers are less likely to be late again in the next year after having received a simplified
reminder letter in the first year, but this effect is offset if they received a tax morale treatment
as well. These effects become smaller, and statistically insignificant two years after the
intervention.3
The particular features of our experimental setting help advancing the growing literature
on randomized controlled tax trials and the evaluation of nudge-type interventions. More
3These findings extend on Brockmeyer et al. (2019), who find sustained effects from a deterrence message
on firms’ tax compliance in Costa Rica. These findings differ from Guyton et al. (2016), who find no long-term
effects and positive returns from repeating reminders in claiming EITC.
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generally, our paper aims to contribute to the rich literature that studies the drivers of tax
compliance (see Slemrod (2018)).4 The first contribution of our paper is to focus on the
role of complexity as a behavioral driver of tax compliance. While we do not address the
complexity of the tax schedule itself (e.g., Chetty and Saez (2013), Abeler and Ja¨ger (2015),
Aghion et al. (2017)), our paper does shed new light on how simplifying communication
can help to overcome information frictions and/or hassle costs associated with the process
of filing and paying taxes (see e.g., Slemrod et al. (2001); Kleven and Kopczuk (2011);
Hoopes et al. (2015); Dwenger et al. (2016); Benzarti (2017)). Relatedly, but in another
context, Bhargava and Manoli (2015) identify barriers to the take-up of EITC benefits due
to information complexity – with the mere simplification of the mailing leading to a significant
increase in take-up. Second, we do not only show that simplifying the communication of the
tax administration has a substantial effect on tax compliance, but also that this effect can
outweigh the effects of nudges related to deterrence and to tax morale. Our study compares
these various drivers of tax compliance in the same way, in the same setting, and on the
same sample, which ensures comparability. This is particularly valuable as the results in the
literature on tax morale are mixed. A number of experiments have found positive impacts
from invoking social norms on tax compliance (e.g., Del Carpio (2014); Bott et al. (2017);
Hallsworth et al. (2017); Perez-Truglia and Troiano (2018)), while several other experiments
testing normative appeals have found null or even negative results (e.g., Blumenthal et al.
(2001); Fellner et al. (2013); John and Blume (2018); Cranor et al. (2018)).5 Third, we ran
five population-wide natural field experiments that changed the communication between the
tax authority and tax payers, which allows us to test the effects of the interventions at scale,
at all stages of the tax process and for different subsets of the tax payer population, thus
strengthening the internal validity of our design.6
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a simple model of tax compliance and
characterizes the cost-effectiveness of different interventions. Section 3 describes the context
and empirical setting. Section 4 discusses the main experimental results, presents the dy-
4On the role of enforcement and deterrence, see reviews by Andreoni et al. (1998) and Slemrod and
Yitzhaki (2002). An example of an RCT changing audit probabilities is Kleven et al. (2011). An example of
an RCT changing the penalty information is Cranor et al. (2018). On the psychological, cultural, social, and
normative factors underlying tax compliance, see Torgler (2007); Alm (2012); Luttmer and Singhal (2014) .
5For example, Hallsworth et al. (2017) find that social norms and public services messages in official
reminder letters increased payment rates for overdue tax in the UK. In contrast, Cranor et al. (2018) find
that invoking social norms has no compliance effects on late tax payers in Colorado, while making the penalty
explicit does. Another recent example is Perez-Truglia and Troiano (2018), who find that shaming tax payers
by making their non-compliance public increases compliance. However, they find no effects from providing
information on others’ non-compliance.
6We also test different variations of similar treatments and study heterogeneous treatment effects with
causal forests (Wager and Athey, 2018), which helps to establish robustness and uncover underlying mecha-
nisms.
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namics and sheds some light on mechanisms. Section 5 analyzes the regression-discontinuity
in enforcement, compares the cost-effectiveness of simplification with traditional enforcement
and studies its long-term effects. Section 6 concludes.
2 Model
We consider a stylized model of tax compliance, revisiting the model of criminal behavior in
Becker (1968) and its adaptation to tax evasion by Allingham and Sandmo (1972). A tax-
payer decides whether to comply with their tax duties, which include the accurate reporting
of their taxable income y and the timely filing and payment of taxes dues τ (y). We model
tax compliance behavior as an action y˜ ∈ [0, y], which solves
min
y˜∈[0,y]
T (y˜) + Φnon−compliance (y − y˜) + Φmorale (y − y˜) + Φcompliance (y˜) ,
with T ′ ≥ 0 and Φ′j ≥ 0. The first and most natural cost from complying is the loss of
resources from paying taxes, T (y˜). However, by complying the taxpayer can avoid follow-up
costs enforced by the tax authority, captured by Φnon−compliance (y − y˜). This is the central
trade-off in the deterrence framework by Allingham and Sandmo (1972), where the tax
authority increases the costs of non-compliance by increasing penalties for non-compliant
behavior and the probability of actual enforcement.7 In addition to the resource costs,
taxpayers may also face an intrinsic cost of non-compliance given their tax morale, captured
by Φmorale (y − y˜). This cost may depend on the perceived fairness of the tax system, the
taxpayer’s valuation of the government’s use of the tax revenues, social norms determined
by the compliance behavior of other tax payers, etc. Finally, we also allow for a direct cost
of compliance Φcompliance (y˜), which can capture the hassle cost of filing and paying taxes,
the attention needed in order to take the appropriate action, etc.
To induce compliant behavior, the tax authority needs to ensure that the cost of compli-
ance is exceeded by its return. Assuming linear cost functions (H (x) = h× x), this can be
represented by
t+ φcompliance ≤ φnon−compliance + φmorale.
The tax authority has a set of instruments available that can affect the vector of cost param-
eters φ determining the taxpayer’s compliance y˜ (φ). This includes standard enforcement
interventions (which affect compliance through φnon−compliance), but also the letter interven-
tions that we consider below. We categorize our interventions as affecting φcompliance through
7Note that the cost Φnon−compliance (y − y˜) can also include the resources taxpayers expend to camouflage
non-compliance (see Slemrod (2018)).
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simplifying/improving the letter design, φnon−compliance through making enforcement and
penalties explicit, and φmorale by invoking tax morale.
The optimal mix of instruments will depend on their cost effectiveness, determined by
their impact on tax revenues ∂T/∂φj and their resource cost to the tax authority ∂C/∂φj.
Leaving aside other considerations, the tax authority should equalize the marginal cost of
raising an extra euro of revenue
∂C/∂φj
∂T/∂φj
, as shown by Keen and Slemrod (2017). In practice,
especially in the case of payment recovery, the tax authority may aim to reach near full
compliance y˜ (φ) ≈ y and rely on stronger enforcement to recover the remaining taxes due.
In that case, the return to alternative interventions is not the increase in tax revenues, but
the costs savings on the standard enforcement measures. The relative cost-effectiveness of
the alternative intervention can then be written as
∂C
∂φnon−compliance
∂C
∂φj
× dφnon−compliance
dφj
|y˜(φ)=y.
This is exactly the metric we will calculate after having estimated the compliance effects and
costs of the letter interventions and standard enforcement.
3 Context and Design
This section presents the five experiments we study and describes the experimental samples.
We also provide some background on the tax filing and payment cycle for personal income
taxation in Belgium.
3.1 Tax Process
In Belgium the tax-to-GDP ratio was 44.6% in 2017, which is above the OECD average of
34.2%. We focus on individual income tax, which is the largest source of tax revenues in
Belgium. In the fiscal year 2016, individual income tax raised 27.7% of overall tax revenues
from 7.1 million taxpayers. Income taxes are collected solely at the federal level. There is
a personal tax-free allowance which stood at 7,130 EUR and marginal taxes rise from 25
to 50%.8 Fiscal years run from January 1st to December 31st, and the tax cycle starts in
July of the year after the fiscal year in which the income has been earned. There are four
main steps in the annual personal income tax cycle, as shown in Figure 1a: tax filing, filing
8In comparison, in the US, the tax-to-GDP ratio is lower (27.1%) and income taxes are more important
as a share of tax revenues (38.6%). Federal marginal tax rates are lower (10 to 37%), but lower levels of
government levy additional taxes.
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reminders, tax payment and payment reminders. We vary the correspondence between the
tax administration and taxpayer at each of these steps.
Tax filing (TF): Taxpayers can file their taxes on paper or online, either by themselves
or with the help of an accountant or a tax official.9 The online portal called “Tax-on-Web”
is increasingly popular and in 2017 it was used by 3.8 million taxpayers, of which 1.7 million
submitted their declarations individually. The remainder filed with the help of an accountant
or a government official.
Filing reminders (TFR): Figure 1b depicts what happens when taxpayers miss the filing
deadline. Filers who have not submitted by the deadline are sent a filing reminder letter, and
given 14 days to file. If a taxpayer has still not filed seven days after this second deadline,
the tax administration uses its own estimates to compute their tax liability. In the fiscal
year 2016, about 170,000 taxpayers had not filed by the deadline, which represents about
3.5% of taxpayers who were expected to file.
Tax payment (TP): A majority of taxpayers are taxed at the source if they are employed
or pre-pay their taxes based on estimates of their tax liability if they are self-employed. A
significant share of taxpayers also have taxable income below the exemption threshold and
thus pay no income taxes. As a result, less than a third of taxpayers (1.9 million in the fiscal
year 2016) receives a tax bill with a positive payable balance, which they need to pay within
the next two months. The majority of such cases can be explained by insufficient withholding
at the source in situations that made it difficult to calculate the exact tax liability (e.g. tax
payers who hold several jobs, students who work part-time, etc.). Total taxes due at that
stage are 3.8 billion euros.
Payment reminders (TPR): Figure 1c depicts what happens when taxpayers miss the
payment deadline. Taxpayers who have not paid two months after receipt of the tax bill
are sent a payment reminder. Taxpayers who still do not comply are then exposed to
further enforcement actions, which start after 14 days. In the fiscal year 2016, about 220,000
taxpayers had still not paid 14 days after the deadline, and owed a total of 0.8 billion euros,
which represents 12% of taxpayers who received a positive tax bill, and 21% of taxes they
owed.
9Not all taxpayers need to file. About a third of taxpayers (2.2 million in the fiscal year 2016) receive
pre-filled tax returns with no further action required.
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3.2 Experiments
We report on a total of five experiments: one on tax filing (TF), one on tax filing reminders
(TFR), one on tax payment (TP) and two on tax payment reminders (TPR). The experi-
ments spanned the three fiscal years (FY) from FY2014 to FY2016. The experiments involve
various randomly assigned treatments that we categorize in three groups: simplification, de-
terrence and tax morale.
In four experiments out of five, the treatment involved simplifying the letter to commu-
nicate more clearly what the tax administration expected from taxpayers. Simplification
included shortening the letter while retaining the action-relevant information. To attract
the attention of the reader, important information was highlighted in color and/or placed in
boxes. The simplified letters were also personalized, i.e., it was addressed to the taxpayer
using his/her name.10 As we discuss below, the exact design of the simplified letter varies
across experiments as does the design of the old letter. The English versions of the old and
simplified letters for the different experiments are shown in Appendix A.1 to A.6; letters
were sent in Flemish, French and German depending on taxpayers’ mother tongue.
The experiments also tested the effect of deterrence and tax morale through the addition
of short messages in the simplified letter. The deterrence messages aimed at making the
consequences of non-compliance explicit, by stating fines and tax increases and/or by men-
tioning follow-up enforcement. We also tested messages that encouraged immediate action
to avoid the fines. The tax morale messages, on the other hand, aimed at raising compliance
by increasing the desire of taxpayers to comply with social norms or to reciprocate for public
goods provision. Appendix Table A.1 lists all the deterrence and tax morale messages used
(translated in English).
TP Experiment: The Tax Payment experiment modified the tax bill sent to taxpayers
with a positive liability: the experiment was carried out between November 2017 and May
2018 with 1,216,317 taxpayers (fiscal year 2016). All treated taxpayers received a simplified
letter, only keeping action-relevant information and improving the overall outline: Appendix
Figure A.1 shows the old letter, and Appendix Figure A.2 the simplified letter. For a subset
of treated individuals, the letter included either deterrence messages or tax morale messages
(see Panel A of Appendix Table A.1). For this experiment, outcomes include the probability
of making a payment following letter receipt (extensive margin response), and the fraction
paid conditional on a payment having been made (intensive margin). As baseline outcome,
we use the probability of payment within 60 days after the letter was sent: 60 days is the
10Only for the TP experiment, we have within-experiment variation in the design of the simplified letter
as the non-personalized address is used for a random subgroup.
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deadline given to taxpayers to pay their outstanding debt.
TPR Experiments: The Payment Reminder experiments were conducted with taxpayers
who were late in paying their tax: 229,751 taxpayers in 2015/16 (FY2014) and 188,180
taxpayers in 2016/17 (FY2015).11 The treatment group received a simplified reminder letter,
in which the outstanding tax liability and the deadline were highlighted and other information
shortened: Appendix Figure A.3 shows the old letter, and Appendix Figure A.4 the simplified
letter. Again, for different subsets of the treatment group, the letter also included deterrence
and tax morale messages (see Panel B of Appendix Table A.1). The baseline outcome we
consider is now the probability of payment within 14 and 180 days after reminder receipt:
14 days corresponds to the time at which enforcement actions begin. To validate the results
and to test the effect of repeated treatments, the TPR experiment was conducted in two
consecutive years.
TF Experiment: The Tax Filing experiment was conducted in 2017 (FY2016) with 1.5
million online tax filers.12 The tax filers were shown a pop-up pie chart either before (treat-
ment) or after (control group) they filed their taxes. The pie chart presented the breakdown
of government spending by categories (see English translation in Appendix Figure A.7).13
The chart was accompanied by a sentence highlighting that these public services were funded
by taxes.14 We consider this as a similar treatment to the tax morale message in the other
experiments. For this experiment, outcomes come from two sources: administrative data on
tax compliance and answers to an online survey to which all online filers were invited. Due to
confidentiality concerns, the administration did not provide individual information but only
average outcomes (or taxpayers characteristics) within a gender-age cell. The main compli-
ance outcome is reported taxable income. Other outcomes are tax liability, self-employed
profits and expenses, expenses of salaried workers and general expenses. These are also
based on declared values. Survey data is available for those who agreed to answer the ques-
tionnaire, which gauges taxpayers’ knowledge and agreement with the way tax revenue is
11In both trials, German speaking taxpayers, taxpayers who had raised objections to the outstanding
amount they owed and taxpayers for whom the government did not have a name were not included in the
randomization and received an old letter. Only debts related to the current fiscal year and letters that are
first means of communication with the taxpayer (no updates on balances owed) are included in the analysis.
12This excludes taxpayers who used an accountant or tax officer to submit their taxes via the online portal.
Our dataset covers taxpayers who submitted their tax returns before mid-August 2017.
13The tax administration also provided a pie chart of government expenditures by region, which was
available when scrolling down.
14For some randomly selected sub-groups, the administration added at the very bottom of the pop-up
an additional sentence that either added a public goods message, mentioned penalties in general terms,
or appealed to social norms in general terms (see Panel C of Appendix Table A.1). We do not find any
differential effect of this second sentence and pool all treatment groups in the analysis.
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spent, and their evaluation of public services and the tax system more generally. The survey
instrument is described in Appendix A.8.15
TFR Experiment: The Filing Reminders experiment was conducted with 148,925 tax-
payers who were late in filing their tax returns in 2016 (FY2015). The treatment group
received a simplified letter, which emphasized the new filing deadline: Appendix Figure A.5
shows the old two-page long letter and Appendix Figure A.6 shows the one-page simplified
letter. A subset of the treatment group received a letter which included deterrence messages
(see Panel D of Appendix Table A.1).16 For these experiments, the baseline outcome is the
probability of filing within 21 days after letter receipt: 21 days is the time at which the tax
administration begins to calculate the tax liability based on income estimates.
3.3 Randomization Design
The allocation of taxpayers to the different treatment groups was done in two different ways.
For the TPR, the TF and the TFR experiments, it was based on the last two digits of
the national identity number, which are random (see Appendix Table A.2). For the TP
experiment, treatment allocation was based on the day of the month the taxpayer was born,
which is also random and independent of the last digits of the national identity number (see
Appendix Table A.3). There are three things to note.
First, treatment allocations for the two tax payment reminder experiments (TPR 2014
and the TPR 2015) were done in such a way that taxpayers of each treatment group in
TPR 2014 had a similar probability to be assigned to each treatment group in TPR 2015.
It follows that the two allocations are almost independent from each other, as in a cross-
cutting randomization design.17 Since there is significant overlap between 2014 and 2015
late payers (see Appendix Table A.4), we have sufficient power to estimate the effect of the
two treatments both separately and jointly, to identify the effect of repeated treatment.
Second, treatment allocations for the TPR 2014 (tax payment reminder) and TFR 2015
(tax filing reminder) experiments coincide partially, but not completely. A potential concern
could be that treatment status in one experiment affects outcomes in a following experiment.
Fortunately, the two experiments were done on different target populations, since the late
payers of 2014 need not be late filers in 2015. Indeed, the overlap between the two populations
15All outcome variables were pre-specified in the Pre-analysis Plan (AEARCTR-0002196).
16In the previous year (FY2014), the administration carried out a separate experiment on filing reminders,
in which it included tax morale messages without simplifying the letter first. We managed to collect data
from this experiment and found no effect of the treatment. Results are not reported here.
17Since 97 digits had to be allocated to 9 treatment groups in TPR 2014 and 10 treatment groups in TPR
2015, the two allocations are independent up to seven digits (11, 22, 33, 64, 75, 86 and 97).
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is small: as Appendix Table A.4 shows, only 6% of late payers for the fiscal year 2014 were
also late filers for the fiscal year 2015. As a robustness check, we estimate the results of the
TFR 2015 experiment controlling for the TPR 2014 treatment assignment and show that
our results do not change.
Third, treatment allocation for the TF 2016 experiment again split the tax sample in two
based on the two last digits of the national identity number, which made it partly, but not
completely coincide with treatment allocations for the TFR and the TPR 2014 experiments.
Unfortunately, to protect privacy the tax administration did not share individual identifiers
for the TF 2016 experiment, which prevents us from measuring the exact overlap with the
sample of the other two experiments, or controlling for assignment to previous treatments.
However, since the sample of the TF experiment is much larger (1.5 million, against 150,000
for TFR and 230,000 for TPR 2014), the overlap is likely to be small.
3.4 Population comparison
As the five experiments take place at different stages of the tax process, they test the effect
of simplification, deterrence and tax morale on different parts of the taxpayer population.
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics on socio-demographic characteristics of the different ex-
perimental samples, as compared to the universe of Belgian taxpayers. The Belgian personal
income taxpayer is on average 49 years old, in a couple in 35% of the time and has 0.4
children (column 1). By convention, in the case of households composed of individuals of
both genders, only the gender of the woman is recorded, so that there are many more female
than males (70%). 33% of the taxpayer population lives in Wallonia and 42% speak French.
On average, they owe e570, but only 28% have a positive tax liability. Taxpayers in the TP
experiment have a tax liability which is by definition positive, with an average of e2676. As
column 2 shows, they are older, more likely to be in a couple and less likely to have children.
In contrast, taxpayers in the TF experiment (column 4), who file online, are younger, and
have more children. Taxpayers in the reminder experiments (TPR and TFR in columns 3
and 5) differ from the overall population in similar ways: they are more likely to be male,
less likely to be in a couple, younger, more likely to speak French and to live in Wallonia.
Taxpayers who are late in paying also have lower tax liability than the average (e1890).
For late taxpayers, we were able to collect two additional covariates: taxable income and
solvency score. The solvency score is the prediction by the tax administration of the prob-
ability that a taxpayer will not be able to pay their debts permanently, based on their tax
returns in the previous year and their debt settlement history.
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4 Experimental Results
This section first presents the main results of our experiments, then discusses the timing of
the effect of the different interventions, and finally explores potential mechanisms.
4.1 Baseline Results
To estimate the effect of simplification, deterrence and tax morale messages in each experi-
ment, we take advantage of the randomization and simply regress compliance outcomes on
treatment dummies and taxpayer controls. The estimating equation writes:
Y i = α + βSSi + ΣjβjT
j
i + γXi + εi,
where Yi is the relevant outcome for taxpayer i, Si is a dummy variable equal to one for tax-
payers who received a simplified letter, T ji are dummy variables equal to one for the different
messages added to the simplified letter, and Xi is a vector of taxpayer characteristics.
The outcome variable Yi we use for our baseline specification in the tax payment experi-
ment is whether the tax liability is paid (in full or in part) before the deadline, which is 60
days after the letter receipt. For the reminder experiments, the outcome variable is whether
taxes are filed or paid before the start of follow-up interventions (respectively after 21 and
14 days for the filing and payment experiments). We consider compliance at different time
horizons and at the extensive vs. intensive margin later in this section. For the tax filing
experiment, the compliance variable is different in nature, since we consider total reported
taxable income. Table 1 presents the full list of controls Xi. Controls include dummies
for gender, couples, age, region, mother tongue, and number of children. For experiments
in which letters were sent out in waves, controls also include dummies for each wave. We
include additional controls for some experiments: dummies for quintiles of amount owed
(TP and TPR experiments), quintiles of income and solvency score (TPR experiment), and
marital status (TF experiment).
The coefficients of interest are βS, which identifies the effect of simplification, and βj,
which identifies the effect of adding a deterrence or tax morale message.
Figure 2 presents our baseline estimates for the simplification, deterrence and tax morale
treatment. The tax payment and tax filing experiments are in the top and bottom panels
respectively. The experiments on the baseline sample of tax payers/filers are on the left,
while reminder experiments for the late payers/filers are on the right. The figure conveys a
very clear and strong pattern across the four experiments. In the three experiments in which
communication with the taxpayer was simplified (TP, TPR and TFR), it had a positive and
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sizeable effect on tax compliance. In the same three experiments, the deterrence messages
had an additional positive effect, which is significant and can be as large as the effect of
simplification. Finally, in the three experiments in which the administration tried to increase
tax morale (TP, TPR and TF), it had either no effect or even reduced compliance.18
The regression estimates are also presented in Table 2, which has the same structure
as Figure 2. The top panel (Panel A) presents the results of the tax payment experiments.
Column 1 shows that simplifying the tax bill had a positive effect on the probability of paying
on time, increasing it by 0.5pp. Adding a deterrence message increased the probability
of paying on time further, by 0.5pp. These effects are relatively small, but significant:
the combined effect of simplification and deterrence messages is 1.4% of the control mean
(72.8%). The tax morale messages, however, had no additional effect on tax compliance.
The effect of −0.1pp is sufficiently precisely estimated to rule out effects of a magnitude
comparable to the simplification and deterrence treatment. Column 2 presents the results
of the payment reminders experiment. The results are qualitatively similar. The effects
of simplification and deterrence are again positive, but the former effect clearly dominates.
That is, simplifying the reminder letters increased the probability of paying by 10pp (22.8%
of the control mean), and deterrence messages had an additional positive effect of 1.2pp
(2.7% of the control mean). Tax morale messages, however, had an opposite effect, slightly
reducing tax compliance (−0.7pp or 1.6% of the control mean). The bottom panel (Panel B)
presents the results of the tax filing experiments, which are again very similar qualitatively.
The tax morale treatment in the tax filing experiment (Panel B Column 1) had no effect on
declared taxable income, with the null effect again being precisely estimated. The estimates
in Column 2 of Panel B show that simplification and deterrence had a large positive effect
on tax compliance among late filers. Those who received a simplified letter were 2.6pp more
likely to file on time. This probability increased by an additional 2.8pp for those who received
a simplified letter with a deterrence message, making them 17% more likely to file on time
than the control group.19
18Another TFR experiment was run in 2014, but unlike the main 2015 experiment, only tax morale
messages were used, and without simplifying the letter. These messages had a null or negative effect on
the probability of filing before enforcement actions started. These results (not shown here) confirm that tax
morale messages do not improve tax compliance.
19Appendix Table A.5 presents the results of the filing reminder experiment controlling for the treatment
assignment in the payment reminder experiment. Due to the partial overlap between the two experiments,
the estimates are less precise, but the magnitude of the treatment effects is similar.
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4.2 Dynamic Effects
We have so far reported treatment effects at one point in time, at the deadline for the tax
payment experiment and before the start of enforcement actions for the reminder experi-
ments. Using the payment and filing history, we can estimate treatment effects at any time
– measured in days – after treatment. Let Yi,t be the tax compliance outcome of individual
i at time t. As before, Si denotes a dummy variable equal to one for taxpayers who received
a simplified letter, T ji are treatment dummies for the addition of deterrence and tax morale
messages and Xi denotes a vector of controls. We estimate the following equation:
Y i,t = αt + βS,tSi + Σjβj,tT
j
i + γXi + i.
For the TP experiment, t ranges from the receipt of the tax bill to 60 days after, corresponding
to the deadline. For the TPR experiment, t ranges from the receipt of the letter to 180 days
after. Note that the deadline is two days after, and that enforcement follow-up does not start
until 14 days later. For the TFR experiment, t ranges from the receipt of the letter, which
gives late filers 14 days to comply, to 60 days after, when the administration automatically
files taxes for non-compliers.
Appendix Figure A.1 displays the dynamics of tax compliance in the control group - the
estimated αt - for the three experiments. In the TP experiment, the proportion of taxpayers
who paid in the control group increased slowly after receipt of the tax bill, and then sharply
just before the deadline, so that 72% of taxpayers met the deadline. In the TPR experiment,
only a minority of late payers (17%) met the renewed deadline, and less than half of them
had paid before the beginning of enforcement actions. The pattern is similar in the TFR
experiment: only 25% of late filers in the control group had filed by the renewed deadline
and only 34% had filed before enforcement actions began.
Figure 3 presents the dynamics of the simplification treatment, βS,t. Taxpayers who
received a simplified tax bill were slightly more likely to pay in the first weeks after tax
bill receipt, but the difference with the control group really widened in the last week before
the deadline. For the late payers, who were given a tight deadline, the simplified reminders
had a strong and immediate effect on payment probability, which peaked around the time
when enforcement actions started. As enforcement actions began, the control group caught
up with treatment, so that the treatment effects decreased steeply, although they were still
statistically significant at the end of the period. In the filing reminder experiment, the sim-
plified reminders also had a strong and rapid effect on filing probability, which accelerated
close to the deadline and peaked at the time at which enforcement actions started. Then, as
income was automatically filed, the difference in manual filing remained constant between
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treatment and control. Taken together, these findings suggest that simplification made both
the need to pay and the actual deadline more salient to taxpayers. For completeness, we also
report on the dynamic effects of deterrence and tax morale messages, βj,t, in Appendix Fig-
ure A.2. Across the three experiments, the additional positive effect of deterrence messages,
which emphasized the penalties associated with missing the deadline, were felt gradually,
and peaked at the deadline. In the Payment Reminder experiment, the negative effect of
tax morale messages lingered for about a month, even after enforcement actions begun.
While our results show that the compliance effects peaked at the deadline or shortly after,
they also clearly show that the effects diminished over time as enforcement actions begun.
This is particularly striking in the TPR experiment. As Table 3 shows, compliance was
10pp higher in treatment than in control after 14 days (before enforcement), 6.9pp higher
after 30 days, and less than 1pp higher after 180 days. Hence, the effect of simplification on
taxes collected was in the end much smaller than the effect on compliance at 14 days would
suggest. However, it declined in part because enforcement actions by the tax administration
made the control group catch up with the treatment group. In Section 5, we will disentangle
the compliance effect of the simplification treatment and the follow-up interventions.
4.3 Mechanisms
The relative impact of the simplification, deterrence and tax morale treatments is remarkably
consistent across experiments implemented at different stages of the tax process, and on
different populations. This section explores potential mechanisms underlying this robust
pattern. We present treatment variations within each category, consider their impact on
alternative outcome variables and present heterogeneous effects estimated with causal forests.
Simplification Our experiments show that simplifying the tax correspondence can
have a substantial impact on compliance and highlighted the dynamic patterns of the com-
pliance effects. We briefly compare the compliance effect across experiments and across slight
treatment variations within one experiment.
To compare the magnitude of the effects of simplification across experiments, it is impor-
tant to keep in mind that while the simplified letters look very similar, the quality of the old
letters was different. In particular, in the tax payment experiment, the required actions were
already grouped together and highlighted in the old letter, but they were made even more
salient in the new letter (Appendix Figures A.1 and A.2). For the old payment reminder
letter, the action-relevant information was hidden and spread out over a long, technical letter
in the old design, also containing information that was only relevant for internal use (Ap-
pendix Figure A.3). The quality of the old filing reminder letter was arguably in between
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(Appendix Figure A.5). In the payment reminder experiment, the simplified presentation
increased tax compliance by as much as 23% before the start of follow-up enforcement. This
effect is larger than in the filing reminder experiment (8%) and an order of magnitude larger
than in the payment experiment (0.7%). Hence, simplification was effective everywhere, but
had a larger impact in contexts where the old letter was more complex.
The dynamic patterns discussed before, with larger effects at the deadline and after
receipt of the letter, suggest that the simplified communication is effective in making the
deadline more salient and reduces chances to forget to pay or file before. This is confirmed
when considering the effects on the extensive and intensive margin. In particular, Panel A
of Appendix Table A.7 shows the treatment effects in the tax payment experiments (TP and
TPR) on the fraction of the tax liability paid conditional on paying. We find positive effects
of simplification at the intensive margin, but of much smaller magnitude than the extensive
margin effects (and only significant in TP). The tax payment experiments (TP and TPR)
also included treatments varying the personalization of the letter design. Specifically, in
the TP experiment, some simplified letters did not address taxpayers by name (Simplified
Not Personalized), and in the TPR FY2015 experiment, in some letters with a deterrence
message the female partner in a couple was addressed before the male (Explicit Penalty FM).
These variations did not make any difference (see Appendix Table A.6).
Deterrence While prior work - both theoretical and empirical - has highlighted the
importance of deterrence to tackle tax evasion, our experiments show that making penalties
explicit in tax correspondence can improve timely tax filing and payment too, with compli-
ance effects between 0.5 and 3pp across the different experiments. We briefly discuss here
the specific deterrence treatments and refer the reader to Appendix Table A.1 for the exact
wording of the messages. The baseline deterrence treatment in the tax payment and payment
reminder experiments states the average penalty (of e209) explicitly. In the filing reminder
experiment, the treatment effect is somewhat larger when instead of the average penalty the
deterrence message states the range of possible penalties (from e5 to e1,250) and tax rate
increases (from 10 to 200%). We also find that making enforcement explicit by emphasizing
the seizing of income/assets to actually collect penalties further increased compliance.20 We
also tested a more implicit variation of the enforcement message, which emphasized that
not paying taxes would be seen as an active choice, building on Hallsworth et al. (2015).
This treatment had no significant effect, potentially in line with the ineffectiveness of the
tax morale treatments in our context. In contrast, a message that empasized that by tak-
20The Explicit Penalty+Enforcement message increases compliance 2.5pp against 1pp for the Explicity
Penalty message in TPR, FY2015 - see Appendix Table A.6. The difference between the two coefficients is
significant with a p-value of 0.001.
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ing immediate action, taxpayers could avoid penalties significantly increased compliance.
In the payment reminder experiment, making the penalty explicit in combination with the
immediacy message increased compliance from 1pp to 1.7pp (see TPR, FY2015 in Appendix
Table A.6).21 Also in the tax payment experiment, we ran a treatment in which we high-
lighted the returns to immediate action to avoid enforcement measures, which increased the
treatment effect from the simplified letter from 0.4 to 0.7pp (see TP in Appendix Table A.6).
This complements the earlier finding from the simplification treatment that besides making
the relevant information salient, there is also a role for encouraging immediate action. We
do not find an effect of deterrence at the intensive margin, when looking at the paid tax
liability conditional on paying (Appendix Table A.7).
Tax Morale Our finding that tax morale messages are ineffective in raising tax com-
pliance contrasts with some earlier studies on tax payment (e.g., Hallsworth et al. (2017) in
the UK) and on tax filing (e.g., Bott et al. (2017) on foreign income reporting in Norway).
However, a series of studies have found no effects when introducing normative appeals (e.g.,
Blumenthal et al. (2001), John and Blume (2018)). We both widen and strengthen the
evidence by finding no or negative results at the payment and the filing stage, for the full
population of tax payers / filers and on the subset of late filers / payers. Since we work on
the universe of Belgium tax payers, the estimates are sufficiently precise to reject at usual
significance levels that tax morale messages have effects of a magnitude comparable to the
simplification and deterrence treatments. The tax morale message is also consistent across
different treatment variations used in previous papers, either emphasizing the social value
of the tax expenditures, or invoking the social norm of tax compliance by other Belgian tax-
payers. For the online tax filing experiment, the treatment is somewhat different (i.e., the
pop-up of a pie chart of tax expenditures) and so is the compliance measure (i.e., reported
taxable income). However, the conclusions are the same.22
Tax morale messages may be ineffective because the messages were ineffective at raising
tax morale, or because tax morale itself is not an important driver of tax compliance. To
shed some light on the reasons why tax morale messages are ineffective, we draw from the
large-scale survey implemented in combination with the online TF experiment. Taxpayers
were invited to participate to an online survey immediately after they filed. The response
rates were similar in treatment and control (resp. 5.15% and 5.14%): in total 79,334 tax filers
21The difference in treatment effects between the explicit penalty and the explicit penalty+immediacy
treatment is significant with a p-value of 0.077.
22Panel B of Appendix Table A.7 shows the impact of the pie chart treatment on five other tax compliance
outcomes, including self-employed profits and deductible expenses. The average treatment effect on tax
compliance is precisely estimated, but always insignificant.
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completed the survey. Appendix Table A.8 presents treatment effects on survey responses.
As expected, tax filers who had seen the pie chart were more likely to say that they knew
how taxes were spent (column 1) and were indeed closer to the truth when asked about the
share of government spending in each category (column 2).23 Second, treated taxpayers did
not only know better, they also agreed more with how taxes were spent in general (column
3). When asked to rank expenditures categories in terms of which the government should
give priority to, their stated preferences were closer to the actual ranking (column 4). They
also reported attaching more value to public services financed with tax revenues (column 5).
In the end, however, treated tax filers were not more likely to be satisfied with the general
tax system and not more likely to agree with the statement that taxes should be reported
honestly (column 6 and 7). These results suggest that while the pie chart treatment was
effective in improving taxpayers’ knowledge and appreciation of how their taxes were spent,
it fell short of improving their tax morale.
Heterogeneous Effects Average treatment effects can mask important heterogeneity,
which is important to better target interventions, and to gauge the distributional conse-
quences of interventions that alleviate heterogeneous frictions.24 We focus on the payment
reminder experiments, for which we were able to obtain a large set of observables (including
various demographics like age, family composition, region, amount owed, taxable income
and solvency score). To discipline our analysis of treatment effect heterogeneity, we use the
causal forests algorithm created by Wager and Athey (2018).25
Figure 4 plots the dispersion of the treatment effects by treatment category (bin size is
set to 0.5pp for all figures). While the figure only uncovers the heterogeneity in treatment
effects based on observables, it is interesting to compare the predicted heterogeneity across
treatments using the same set of observables. Indeed, we see a wide dispersion for the
simplification treatment, but less so for the deterrence and tax morale ones. Moreover, the
effect of the simplification treatment never turns negative, while the deterrence treatment
has negative effects for some tax payers. Interestingly, the tax morale treatments seem to
backfire for most taxpayers: almost all estimated treatment effects are negative.
Using the same causal forests estimates, we can determine which observable characteris-
tics drive the heterogeneity in treatment effects. Figures A.3a to A.3h in Appendix present
the average of the different observables in each treatment effect quintile. The machine learn-
23Using respondents’ responses, we construct a knowledge index equal to minus the standardized sum of
absolute deviations between the stated and the actual share over all spending categories.
24See for example Alcott et al. (2018) in the context of using corrective sin taxes.
25According to Chernozhukov et al. (2018), we are in the case where the Wager and Athey (2018)
method provides robust results: we have 10 dimensions of heterogeneity and about 230,000 observations
(log(230, 000) = 12 > 10).
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ing results identify four relevant dimensions of treatment heterogeneity: age, number of
children, tax liability and solvency. We confirm that these dimensions matter everything
else equal, by regressing tax compliance on interactions of the treatment with these four
main characteristics, including interactions of the treatment with all other characteristics as
controls. Table A.9 presents the results.26 Simplification is more effective among taxpayers
with children, who may have a harder time to track deadlines. Simplification is also more
effective among taxpayers with a solvency score (as predicted by the tax administration) that
is neither too high nor too low, i.e. it has little effect on people who pay their taxes readily
or on people who face financial difficulties in paying their taxes. Deterrence is most effective
for younger taxpayers (who may be less aware of enforcement actions) and taxpayers with
a lower outstanding liability (for whom the average penalty may seem high as compared to
what they owe). There is no obvious pattern for gender, language, region or income.
5 Simplification and Enforcement
The previous section compared the effect of different letter interventions on tax compliance.
As shown in Section 2, we eventually care about how much the interventions increase tax
revenues and reduce the need for follow-up enforcement by the tax authority. This section
estimates the cost-effectiveness of letter interventions relative to standard enforcement ac-
tions. To that purpose, we exploit a regression discontinuity in enforcement intensity for the
late tax payers, which, combined with the experimental design of the tax payment reminders,
provides a unique opportunity to compare the compliance effect of letter interventions and
standard policy levers for the same population and in the same setting.
5.1 Nudges vs. Enforcement
The tax administration relies on various enforcement actions to make late payers comply.
The first follow-up intervention for late tax filers and taxpayers is naturally the reminder
letter, which we experimentally manipulated. Individuals who do not comply after receiving
the reminder are subject to further enforcement actions. Local tax administrators have some
discretion in the choice of enforcement mechanisms. Commonly used tools for payment non-
compliers include sending registered letters (which require confirmation of receipt), imposing
garnishments and the use of bailiffs. The dynamic pattern of the treatment effects (Figure 3)
showed that the letter treatments accelerated tax payments, but that their final effect on tax
compliance was more modest. The timing of the decline in treatment effects corresponds to
26Appendix Table A.10 present similar results for the second TPR experiment (fiscal year 2015).
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the start of the enforcement actions undertaken by the administration, which suggests that
these actions are responsible for the control group catching up with treatment.
To provide causal evidence on the effect of enforcement actions, we implement a regression
discontinuity design which exploits exogenous variation in enforcement intensity at a specific
threshold for the outstanding tax liability. We then combine the regression discontinuity
with the simplification treatment to understand both how much the simplification treatment
reduced the need for follow-up enforcement and how much the follow-up enforcement reduced
the impact of the simplification treatment.
As Panel (a) of Figure 5 shows, there is a clear jump in the probability of enforcement
actions above the tax liability threshold (normalized to 0 for confidentiality reasons), both
in the treatment and control group.27 There is no evidence of bunching below the thresh-
old, which confirms that it is not known to the public (see Figure A.4). Moreover, before
enforcement started, the probability of paying is smooth at the cut-off in both groups. This
probability of paying, however, is much higher in the treatment than in the control group,
which explains why both to the left and to the right of the cut-off, the treatment group is less
likely to be subject to enforcement interventions. Importantly, the absence of discontinuities
in the density and the pre-enforcement outcomes, both in the treatment and control group,
seems to validate the use of a regression discontinuity design to estimate the causal effect of
enforcement actions.
The impact of enforcement on compliance is illustrated in panel (b) of Figure 5. The
fraction of taxpayers who have paid after 180 days is higher to the right than to the left
of the threshold. Interestingly, compliance levels are similar in the treatment and control
group to the right of the cut-off where enforcement intensity is high, while to the left where
intensity is lower the treatment group is substantially more compliant.
To estimate the causal effects of the simplification treatments and the enforcement ac-
tions, we implement the standard regression discontinuity method in the control group, and
add treatment dummies. Formally, let Yi denote the tax compliance outcome of individual
i, zi their tax liability, c the tax liability cutoff. As before, Si a dummy variable equal to
one for the randomly assigned group who received the simplified letter and Xi is a vector of
individual characteristics (see Table 1). The estimating equation is:
Yi = α + βSSi + βE1{zi − c > 0}+ βS,ESi × 1{zi − c > 0}
+ δC,l(zi − c) + δC,r1{zi − c > 0} × (zi − c) + δS,lSi × (zi − c)
+ δS,rSi × 1{zi − c > 0} × (zi − c) + γXi + εi
27We exclude taxpayers with a liability exactly at the cut-off. The threshold value is a round number and
the distribution of liabilities shows bunching at all round numbers in the vicinity of the threshold.
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Due to the random assignment, βS identifies the effect of simplification at the cutoff from
the left, where enforcement is weaker. Due to the regression-discontinuity, βE identifies the
effect of additional enforcement actions on tax compliance in the control group. Combining
the two sources of variation, βS,E identifies the difference in treatment effects due to higher
enforcement at the threshold. As in a typical regression discontinuity setting, δC,l and
δC,r capture the relation between the forcing variable (tax liability) and the outcome (tax
compliance) to the left and the right of the discontinuity, while δS,l and δS,r allow this
relation to be different for the treatment group. An alternative interpretation is that the
latter interaction terms allow for heterogeneity in treatment effects depending on the tax
liability, both to the left and to the right of the cutoff.
Table 4 presents the corresponding regression results, using the Imbens-Kalyanaraman
bandwidth computed for the control group in our experiment. We first consider the RDD
estimates for the control group in our experiment. Column 1 confirms that the probability
of enforcement increased by 15pp, from 21 to 36%, at the threshold. Before enforcement
actions begun, the payment probability, however, was smooth at the threshold (Column 2).
In contrast, 180 days after reminder receipt, the payment probability increased by 6.1pp at
the threshold, reaching a probability of 87% for taxpayers in the control group to the right
of the threshold (Column 3). Second, we consider the effects of simplification, not just on
payment, but also on follow-up enforcement. As Column 1 shows, simplification decreased
the probability of any enforcement action by almost half, from 21% in the control to 13%.
This is due to the fact that simplified reminders made late payers 15pp more likely to pay
before enforcement actions begun: from 49 to 64% (Column 2). Note that these effects are
larger than those we report for the whole late payer sample (see Table 2). After 180 days,
once payment rates in the control group have increased to 81%, the treatment effects were
smaller, but still significant: a 4.4pp increase (Column 3). Finally, we estimate the difference
in treatment effects to the left and to the right of the threshold. While the difference βS,E
is not significant, the estimate is negative and large enough to mostly offset the positive
treatment effect on the probability of paying at 180 days (Column 3).28 This confirms the
graphical evidence that with high intensity enforcement the effects of simplification in the
long run are virtually zero.
While the compliance benefits of nudges seem to disappear because of follow-up interven-
tions on non-compliant taxpayers, they do bring important benefits by saving on enforcement
costs as we discuss further below. Interestingly, we can also use our results to estimate the
counterfactual effect of simplification after 180 days if the follow-up enforcement interven-
tion had not taken place. Of course, in practice, the reminder letters effectiveness depends
28Note that these effects are driven by registered letters and garnishments (Appendix Table A.12).
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on tax payers’ expectation of the follow-up enforcement by the administration. Still, to
calculate the effect of simplification net of the crowd-out by the follow-up interventions, we
impute the level of compliance based on the difference in compliance between high and low
intensity enforcement groups scaled up by the difference in enforcement probability between
them. Formally, let Y denote the payment probability, F the enforcement probability, z tax
liability, c the cutoff and S letter simplification. Let the superscript F and Y denote the es-
timated coefficients when the dependent variable is F and Y , respectively. We approximate
the average treatment effect in absence of enforcement, ATE0, by:
ATE0 ≈
[
E(Y |S=1,z<c)− E(F |S=1,z<c)E(Y |S=1,z>c)− E(Y |S=1,z<c)
E(F |S=1,z>c)− E(F |S=1,z<c)
]
−
[
E(Y |S=0,z<c)− E(F |S=0,z<c)E(Y |S=0,z>c)− E(Y |S=0,z<c)
E(F |S=0,z>c)− E(F |S=0,z<c)
]
=
(α̂Y + β̂YS )− (α̂F + β̂FS )
(
β̂YE + β̂
Y
S,E
)
(
β̂FE + β̂
F
S,E
)
− [α̂Y − α̂F β̂YE
β̂FE
]
= 0.077
This calculation relies on a homogeneity assumption: we need that the effect of enforcement
on the payment probability is the same for taxpayers who pay only when enforcement inten-
sity increases from below to above the threshold and for taxpayers who pay even with low
intensity enforcement. The counterfactual analysis suggests that in absence of the follow-up
enforcement actions, the effect of simplification on the payment probability of late payers
would have been 7.7pp after 180 days, which is approximately half of the effect estimated
before enforcement actions begun (15pp).
5.2 Cost-Effectiveness and Welfare
We now evaluate the cost-effectiveness of the simplification treatment. We consider three
closely related approaches. First, we compare the benefits of the treatment in terms of
additional revenue and savings on enforcement actions to the costs of simplifying the tax
correspondence. Second, we compare the cost of raising one euro of extra revenue through
reminder simplification and through enforcement actions. Finally, we calculate the total cost
of enforcement actions that is needed to raise the same extra revenue as the simplification
treatment could.
The first method is based on experimental results only. To compute extra revenues, we
estimate the effect of simplified letters on the probability of paying taxes as late as possible
in the tax cycle, which is 180 days after the payment deadline, and assume that after this
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date the treatment effect will remain constant.29 As Table 3 shows, the estimated treatment
effect on the probability of payment at 180 days is 1pp, which we multiply by the average
amount paid, conditional on a payment, at that date (e1,615) and the number of tax payers
in the treatment group (205,014) to obtain total extra revenues equal to e3.16 million. To
compute savings on the cost of enforcement, we estimate the effect of simplified letters on
the probability of the three most common forms of enforcement actions – registered letters,
garnishment and bailiffs. Multiplied by the cost of the respective enforcement measures, we
obtain a total cost saving of e0.70 million.30 Adding the extra revenues and costs savings
on enforcement, the total benefit of the intervention equals e3.86 million. In comparison,
the costs of simplification were negligible: the administration paid e69,300 for the design
of the new letter, including ICT staff, data analysts, legal experts, communication staff and
management, and the printing of the new (colored) letter costs an extra e0.05 per letter.
The total cost of simplifying the reminder letters amounts to e79, 550 and is about 50 times
smaller than its benefits. Simplifying the reminder letters was thus a high return investment
for the tax administration.
The second method builds on the regression discontinuity results from the previous sec-
tion. Since we are able to estimate the compliance effects of the simplification treatment
and the enforcement interventions separately, we can ask what the most cost-effective way is
to raise one euro of extra revenue. The conceptual framework in Section 2 made clear that
from an efficiency prespective, an optimal use of simplification and enforcement actions by
the government should equalize the marginal cost of raising an additional euro of revenue
between them. For the enforcement interventions, we first use regression discontinuity es-
timates for the increase in the probability that registered letters (11.0pp) and garnishment
(7.1pp) were sent at the threshold (see Appendix Table A.12) and their cost (e5.7 and e17.1
respectively) to compute the cost of the increase in enforcement intensity at the threshold,
which is e1.85.31 We then use regression discontinuity estimates of the effect of enforcement
intensity on the probability of payment at 180 days (from Table 4) multiplied by average
payments made at the threshold to estimate additional revenues raised. The ratio of the two,
i.e., the cost of raising one more euro of tax revenues through enforcement is equal to e0.31.
29After 180 days, tax filing for the next fiscal year begins: the administrative data that we use does not
allow us to track outstanding debts separately from new tax liabilities.
30As Appendix Table A.11 shows, the estimated treatment effects on follow-up enforcement are −7.4pp for
registered letters, −2.8pp for garnishment actions and −1.2pp for bailiffs. Multiplying these figures by the
cost of each action and the number of treated taxpayers, we obtain costs savings of e86, 436 for registered
letters, e97, 357 for garnishment and e517, 318 for bailiffs.
31As Appendix Table A.12 shows, there is no significant increase in the use of bailiff at the threshold. As
an enforcement tool, the use of bailiffs is applied to debts of relatively large amounts, while registered letters
and garnishments are more often employed.
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This estimate is arguably in the range of standard estimates of the marginal excess burden
of personal income taxes, suggesting that the enforcement intensity may well be desirable
(Keen and Slemrod, 2017). In comparison, the resource cost of using nudge interventions is
much smaller: e79, 550 in total, or e0.39 per letter sent. We multiply our counterfactual es-
timate of the effect of simplification on the probability of payment in the absence of follow-up
enforcement by the average tax payment, and obtain e7.53 extra revenue per letter. Hence
the cost of raising one euro with simplified reminders is e0.05, which is six times smaller
than with enforcement actions.32 This second method confirms that simplifying reminders
is far more cost-effective than intensifying enforcement.
The third method extrapolates the regression discontinuity results to the whole sample,
using a back-of-the envelope calculation. At the enforcement threshold, the treatment effect
was 15.1pp after 14 days and the counterfactual effect absent follow-up enforcement at 180
days was 7.7pp (Table 4). Hence for the whole sample the estimated treatment effect of
10.3pp after 14 days suggests that the counterfactual effect, in the absence of follow-up
enforcement, would have been 10.3∗7.7/15.1 = 5.2pp at 180 days. Multiplying this figure by
the amount paid by the average taxpayer and by the number of letters sent gives e17.5million
of extra revenue. To obtain these extra revenues with traditional enforcement methods at
the cost of 31 cents per euro raised, the government would have had to spend e5.4 million.
This is again subtantially higher than the cost of the simplification intervention (e79, 550).
Regardless of the method we use for the cost-benefit analysis, simplifying letters seems
highly cost effective, in itself and when compared to the alternative of using standard enforce-
ment actions. The above calculations, however, ignore other welfare-relevant considerations
that may be important when assessing the use of nudges. First of all, the letter treatments
- when successful - changed the net transfers between taxpayers and the government, not
only by affecting the taxes paid, but also avoiding the late penalties and interests on out-
standing tax liability. Second, the nudges can affect individuals’ welfare above and beyond
their after-tax income. The simplified correspondence reduces compliance costs, but may
also reduce the disutility of paying taxes.33 While the same may be true for highlighting the
public value of taxes paid, the opposite effect seems as plausible when using deterrence or
invoking social norms.
32We consider this a conservative estimate as the cost of nudging is largely driven by the fixed costs of
experimental design. If these are ignored the per letter cost goes down to 0.05 making it eight times cheaper
and thus lowering significantly the cost to benefit ratio of the nudging intervention.
33For example, Di Tella et al. (2015) show that complexity can lead people to be “conveniently upset” and
use it as an excuse not to comply.
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5.3 Long-term Effects
We have shown that simplification is effective at different stages of the tax process, and for
different subpopulations of income taxpayers. We have also shown that in the case of payment
reminders, it is very cost effective, in itself and as compared to traditional enforcement
actions. We now ask whether the simplification intervention only works once and its effects
are short-lived, or to contrary, (i) has long-term effects and (ii) can be used repeatedly on
the same taxpayers. To test this, we exploit the two payment reminder experiments carried
out over two consecutive years.
We first investigate whether simplification of communication in one fiscal year can im-
prove compliance in subsequent years. We use the randomization in the FY2014 payment
reminder experiment to estimate the effect of reminder letters on timely payment in the
next two fiscal years (FY2015 and FY2016). The results are shown in column 1 of Panel
A of Table 5. We find a positive and significant effect of simplification on tax compliance
in the next financial year. The probability of paying taxes on time in FY2015 increased
by 1.3pp. Note that this long-term effect of simplification of the reminder letter is twice as
large as the short-run effect of the simplification of the tax bill itself (0.5pp increase in the
probability of meeting the deadline, see column 1 in Table 2). This may be due to the fact
that the simplification of the reminder letter was more substantial than the simplification
of the tax bill, as discussed in the previous section. Also, the reminder letters were sent
to a subsample of taxpayers who may be more sensitive to simplification. Two fiscal years
after the intervention, the effect of simplification had declined to 0.5pp, and the coefficient
is no longer significant (column 2 Panel A of Table 5). In contrast with simplification, the
deterrence messages had no effect in the following fiscal years, but the negative effect of tax
morale messages was remarkably persistent. Overall, these results suggest that small nudges
can have long-term effects, and that the benefits of simplification may be even larger than
our cost-benefit analysis based on the effects in one fiscal year only would suggest.
We then ask whether repeated interventions remain effective. For this we use the cross-
randomization of the FY2014 and FY2015 payment reminders experiments. First, we check
that the FY2014 experimental results replicate in FY2015 (see Appendix Table A.13). In
FY2015 as in FY2014, simplifying tax reminders had a large positive effect on the probability
of paying before enforcement starts (+10.7pp), and deterrence messages had an additional
positive effect (+1.4pp), while tax morale messages had a negative effect (−1.2pp). In-
terestingly, mixing deterrence and tax morale messages had a significantly smaller impact
than deterrence messages alone. Given that the treatment effects replicate, we can now test
whether simplified letters had a larger or smaller effect for taxpayers who received them
twice, i.e. whether repetition induced a reinforcement or a fatigue effect. The results are
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presented in Panel B of Table 5. To simplify the exposition, we estimate the effect of receiv-
ing any simplified letter in FY2014, in FY2015 or in both years.34 Among taxpayers who
were late twice, the estimated effect of the simplified letter in FY2015 is again large (9.9pp)
and comparable to the estimated effect of a simplified letter on the late tax payers in FY2014
(Table 2) and in FY2015 (Appendix Table A.13). Interestingly, among taxpayers who were
late twice, but already received a simplified letter in FY2014, the effect of the simplified
letter in FY2015 is the same (i.e., the interaction coefficient is zero). As simplification is not
less effective when used repeatedly, this result suggest that fatigue effects are unimportant.
However, taxpayers who were late twice are of course a selected sample of taxpayers and we
know that the simplification in FY2014 itself affected the selection as it decreases the prob-
ability of being late again in FY2015. For completeness, we also report effects for the whole
sample of taxpayers who were late in FY2014 (column 2) rather than just for the subsample
(30%) of taxpayers who were late again in FY2015 (column 1). Also in the whole sample,
we find a significant positive effect of simplification in FY2015 (2.4pp) and no evidence that
simplification was less effective for those who had received the simplified letter in FY2014
(precise zero on the interaction term).
6 Conclusion
Based on a series of population-wide experiments in Belgium, we show that simplifying com-
munication by the tax administration consistently improves tax compliance. Simplification
makes taxpayers pay taxes on time and makes both late filers and late payers comply more
swiftly than they would otherwise. Our results also demonstrate the added benefits from
including deterrence messages in the same context but suggest that invoking tax morale does
not raise compliance and often backfires. Finally, we estimate causally the costs and benefits
of simplification as compared to traditional enforcement actions, and find simplification to
be highly cost effective. The positive effects of simplification persist in the next fiscal year
and are sustained when simplification is repeated. Making it as easy as possible to comply
therefore deserves greater attention from tax administrations around the world.
34The estimated effects of simplification are similar when we include dummy variables for the different
messages and their interactions (Appendix Table A.14). Note that with the treatment interactions, the
estimation is based on relatively small subsamples and the estimates become less precise.
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Figure 2: Summary of the Main Results
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Note: The figure presents treatment effect estimates from baseline specifications for the TP (Panel (a)),
TPR FY2014 (Panel (b)), TF (Panel (c)) and TFR FY2015 (Panel (d)) experiments. The outcome is partial
payment probability at 60 days (deadline) in Panel (a), and at 14 days (enforcement) in Panel (b). The
outcome is reported taxable income in Panel (c) and filing probability at 21 days (enforcement) in Panel (d).
Control variables are listed in Table 1, for exact estimates refer to Table 2. 95% confidence intervals based
on robust standard errors are plotted. Standard errors are clustered by date of letter receipt in Panels (a)
and (b).
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Figure 3: Dynamic Effects of Simplification
(a) Tax Payment
(b) Payment Reminder
(c) Filing Reminder
Note: The figure presents simplification treatment effect estimates by days since letter receipt for the TP
(Panel (a)), TPR FY2014 (Panel (b)) and TFR FY2015 (Panel (c)) experiments. The outcome is partial
payment probability in Panels (a) and (b), and filing probability in Panel (c). The vertical lines indicate the
payment/filing deadline and/or the day enforcement actions start. Control variables are listed in Table 1.
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors plotted. Standard errors are clustered by date of
letter receipt in Panels (a) and (b).
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Figure 4: Distribution of treatment effects
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(c) Tax Morale
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Note: The figure presents the distribution of estimated treatment effects in the TPR FY2014 experiment.
It uses the generalized random forest (GRF) algorithm (Wager and Athey, 2018) as described in the text.
Figures (a)-(c) differ in the definition of treatment and control groups. In Figure (a) the control is composed
of taxpayers who received the old letter and the treatment of taxpayers who received a simplified letter
without any additional message. In Figure (b) and (c) taxpayers who received a simplified letter without
any additional message are the control group. In Figure (b) the treatment is composed of taxpayers who
received a simplified letter with a deterrence message. In Figure (c) the treatment is composed of taxpayers
who received a simplified letter with an added tax morale message.
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Figure 5: Effects of Enforcement and Simplification
(a) Probability of Enforcement after 180 Days
(b) Probability of Partial Payment after 180 Days
Note: The figure is based on the TPR FY2014 experiment. It shows probability of enforcement after 180 days
(Panel (a)) and probability of partial payment after 180 days (Panel (b)) by initial amount owed (centred
at the enforcement threshold). Bin size is set to e5 and amounts within e100 of the enforcement threshold
are considered. Fractional polynomial predictions plotted.
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Tables
Table 1: Summary Statistics of Control Variables
Experiment: All taxpayers Tax Payment Tax Filing
Payment Reminder Filing Reminder
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Demographics
Male dummy 0.309 0.324 0.448 0.276 0.529
(0.462) (0.468) (0.497) (0.447) (0.499)
Couple dummy 0.346 0.415 0.298 0.445 0.132
(0.476) (0.493) (0.457) (0.497) (0.339)
Age 49.495 53.354 47.764 47.596 42.229
(18.129) (16.382) (15.611) (15.585) (16.249)
Number of children 0.413 0.351 0.409 0.579 0.334
(0.869) (0.771) (0.830) (0.950) (0.836)
Married dummy 0.476
(0.499)
Widowed dummy 0.040
(0.196)
Divorced dummy 0.156
(0.363)
Region / Language
Wallonia dummy 0.327 0.316 0.367 0.284 0.390
(0.469) (0.465) (0.482) (0.451) (0.488)
Flanders dummy 0.570 0.596 0.525 0.637 0.390
(0.495) (0.491) (0.499) (0.481) (0.488)
French dummy 0.421 0.386 0.473 0.357 0.592
(0.494) (0.487) (0.499) (0.479) (0.491)
German dummy 0.006 0.011 - 0.003 0.007
(0.076) (0.104) (0.051) (0.084)
Other
Amount owed 568.635 2676.205 1890.950
(7301.068) (11869.230) (4746.221)
Income 33211.010
(28804.210)
Solvency score 11.657
(4.674)
N 6,689,779 1,216,317 229,751 942,571 148,925
Note: The table presents means and standard deviations (in parentheses) of control variables for different
samples. In column 1 the sample is composed of all individual income taxpayers in FY2016. In column 2 it
is the sample of the TP FY2016 experiment. In column 3 it is the sample of the TPR FY2014 experiment.
In column 4 it is the sample of the TF FY2016 experiment. In column 5 it is the sample of the TFR FY2015
experiment. The base category for gender is female, for region Brussels, for language Flemish and for marital
status single.
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Table 2: Main Results
Panel A: Payment Probability of some payment
at 60 days (deadline) at 14 days (before enforcement)
Tax Payment Payment Reminders
(1) (2)
Simplified (S) 0.005 0.102
(0.001) (0.010)
+ Deterrence 0.005 0.012
(0.001) (0.003)
+ Tax Morale -0.001 -0.007
(0.001) (0.003)
P-values of tests:
Simplified=Control 0.001 0.001
S+Deterrence=Simplified 0.001 0.001
S+Tax Morale=Simplified 0.167 0.083
Control mean 0.728 0.447
N 1,216,317 229,751
Panel B: Filing Log pre-check Probability of having filed
taxable income at 21 days (before enforcement)
Tax Filing Filing Reminders
(1) (2)
Simplified (S) 0.026
(0.005)
+ Deterrence 0.028
(0.004)
Tax Morale -0.001
(0.001)
P-values of tests:
Simplified=Control 0.001
S+Deterrence=Simplified 0.001
Tax Morale=Control 0.413
Control mean 15.041 0.317
N 942,571 148,925
Note: The table presents treatment effect estimates from baseline specifications in four separate experiments.
Column 1 in Panel A presents the results of the TP experiment (taxpayers for the FY2016). Column 2 in
Panel A presents the results of the TPR 2014 experiment (late taxpayers in the FY2014). Column 1 in Panel
B presents the results of the TF experiment (online tax filers in the FY2016). Column 2 in Panel B presents
the results of the TFR experiment (late tax filers in the FY2015). Control variables are listed in Table 1.
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by date of letter receipt in Panel A. p-values are adjusted
for multiple hypothesis testing (List et al., 2016). 34
Table 3: Dynamic Effects of Payment Reminders FY2014
Probability of some payment
at 2 days at 14 days at 30 days at 180 days
(deadline) (before enforcement) (after enforcement)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Simplified 0.065 0.103 0.069 0.010
(0.011) (0.010) (0.004) (0.003)
P-values of tests:
Simplified=Control 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Control mean 0.166 0.447 0.598 0.845
N 229,751 229,751 229,751 229,751
Note: The table presents treatment effect estimates from the payment reminders experiment (TPR FY2014).
Control variables are listed in Table 1. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by date of letter receipt.
p-values are adjusted for multiple hypothesis testing (List et al., 2016).
Table 4: RDD: Effect of Simplification vs. Enforcement in TPR 2014
Probability of enforcement Probability of some payment
at 180 days at 14 days at 180 days
(before enforcement) (after enforcement)
(1) (2) (3)
Simplified (S) -0.078 0.151 0.044
(0.025) (0.025) (0.019)
Enforcement 0.146 0.006 0.061
(0.034) (0.034) (0.027)
S * Enforcement -0.064 0.000 -0.027
(0.036) (0.036) (0.028)
Control Mean 0.210 0.489 0.813
N 16,277 23,312 21,894
Note: The table presents simplification treatment effect estimates and enforcement RDD
estimates for the TPR experiment (FY2014). Simplified is a dummy variable equal to one
for taxpayers who received a simplified letter. Enforcement is a dummy variable equal to
one for liability amounts above the cut-off value. Control variables are listed in Table 1.
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by date of letter receipt.
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Table 5: Long-term and Repeated Treatment Effects
Panel A: Long-term Effects Probability of being on time Probability of being on time
with payment FY+1 year with payment FY+2 years
(1) (2)
Simplified (S) 0.013 0.005
(0.003) (0.004)
+ Deterrence -0.002 -0.003
(0.003) (0.002)
+ Tax Morale -0.009 -0.005
(0.002) (0.003)
P-values of tests:
Simplified=Control 0.001 0.430
S+Deterrence=Simplified 0.493 0.509
S+Tax Morale=Simplified 0.016 0.253
Control mean 0.703 0.776
N 229,751 229,751
Panel B: Repeated Treatment Probability of some payment at 14 days (before enforcement) in FY2015
Sample of Taxpayers Sample of Taxpayers
late in FY2014 and FY2015 late in FY2014
(1) (2)
Simplified 2014 -0.000 -0.001
(0.010) (0.005)
Simplified 2015 0.099 0.024
(0.011) (0.007)
S 2014 * S 2015 -0.002 0.004
(0.009) (0.006)
P-values of tests:
Simplified 2014=Control 0.424 0.956
Simplified 2015=Control 0.001 0.001
S 2014*S 2015=S 2015 0.535 0.278
Control mean 0.410 0.825
N 66,705 229,751
Note: The table presents results from the replication, long-term and repeated treatment analysis. The
sample in Panel A is the universe of late payers in FY2014. In Panel B column 1 it is composed of taxpayers
who were late with payment in both FY2014 and FY2015. In Panel B column 2 it is composed of the
universe of late payers in FY2014. Control variables are listed in Table 1. Standard errors in parentheses are
clustered by date of letter receipt. p-values are adjusted for multiple hypothesis testing (List et al., 2016).
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ONLINE APPENDIX
Figure A.1: Dynamics of Tax Compliance in the Control Group
(a) Tax Payment
(b) Payment Reminder
(c) Filing Reminder
Note: The figure presents average compliance in the control group by days since letter receipt for the
TP (Panel (a)), TPR FY2014 (Panel (b)) and TFR FY2015 (Panel (c)) experiments. Outcome is partial
payment probability at 60 days / deadline in Figure (a) and at 14 days / enforcement start in Figure (b);
outcome is filing probability at 21 days / enforcement start in Figure (c).
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Figure A.2: Dynamic Effects of Deterrence and Tax Morale Messages
(a) Tax Payment
(b) Payment Reminder
(c) Filing Reminder
Note: The figure presents deterrence and tax morale treatment effect estimates by days since letter receipt
for the TP (Panel (a)), TPR FY2014 (Panel (b)) and TFR FY2015 (Panel (c)) experiments. The outcome
is partial payment probability in Panels (a) and (b), and filing probability in Panel (c). The vertical lines
indicate the payment/filing deadline and/or the day follow-up enforcement starts. Controls are listed in
Table 1. 95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors are plotted. Standard errors are clustered
by date of letter receipt in Panels (a) and (b).
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Figure A.3: Average Value of Control Variables by Quintile of Treatment Effects
Simplification Deterrence Tax Morale
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Simplification Deterrence Tax Morale
(e) Average of Region Categories
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(f) Average Solvency Score
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(h) Average Tax Liability
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Note: The figure presents the mean and 95% confidence interval of control variables from TPR FY2014
experiment by quintile of conditional average treatment effect (CATE). These were estimated using the
generalized random forest (GRF) algorithm (Wager and Athey, 2018). Three panels in each figure differ in
the definition of treatment and control groups. The underlying sample of taxpayers are those in the control
group and those sent a simplified letter without additional messages in the left panel, simplified letter and
a simplified letter with a deterrence message in the middle panel, a simplified letter and a simplified letter
with a tax morale message in right panel.
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Figure A.4: RDD – Identifying Assumptions
(a) Density around the threshold - Control
(b) Density around the threshold - Treatment
(c) Probability of Paying before Enforcement
Note: The figure is based on the TPR FY2014 experiment. It explores the plausibility of the identification
assumptions underlying the RDD. Panels (a) and (b) plot the average density by bin in the control and
treatment group, respectively. Panel (c) plots the probability of payment before enforcement by initial
amount owed (centred at the enforcement threshold). Bin size is set to e5 and amounts within e100 of the
enforcement threshold are considered. Fractional polynomial predictions are plotted as well.
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Figure A.5: Effects of Enforcement
(a) Probability of Enforcement at 180 days
(b) Probability of Partial Payment at 14 days /
enforcement start
(c) Probability of Partial Payment at 180 days
Note: The figure is based on the the TPR FY2014 experiment. It shows probability of enforcement after
180 days (Panel (a)), probability of paying after 14 days (Panel (b)) and probability of paying after 180
days (Panel (c)) by initial amount owed (centred at the enforcement threshold). Bin size is set to e5 and
amounts within e100 of the enforcement threshold are considered. Fractional polynomial predictions with
95% confidence intervals plotted. 46
Table A.1: Deterrence and Tax Morale Messages by Experiment
Experiment / Type Name Message
Panel A: Tax Payment
Deterrence Explicit Penalty These costs amount to 209 euros on average and can go up
depending on the circumstances.
Enforcement + Immediacy Warning: do not wait until the deadline to pay, you run the
risk of being late. If you do not pay on time, we will start
actions to recover this amount.
Tax Morale Social Norm In Belgium 95% of taxes are paid on time.
Public Goods Tax revenues allow basic public services such as health care,
education and law and order, to function.
Panel B: Payment Reminders
Deterrence Explicit Penalty (EP) These costs amount to 209.00 euro on average and may, depending on
(FY2014, 2015) the situation, rise further.
Active Choice Not paying your taxes will be seen as an active choice.
(FY2014)
EP + Immediacy These costs amount to 209.00 euro on average and may, depending on
(FY2015) the situation, rise further. By paying now you may still avoid these
costs.
EP + Enforcement These costs amount to 209.00 euro on average and may, depending on
(FY2015) the situation, rise further. We will undertake actions to claim tax dues
that may involve seizing your income or your assets.
EP (Female Name First) Woman’s name, Man’s name (instead of reversed)
(FY2015)
Tax Morale Social Norm You belong to a minority of taxpayers who did not pay their
(FY2014, 2015) taxes within the legal period: 95% of taxes in Belgium are
paid on time. Why not follow this example?
Public Goods Paying taxes guarantees the provision of essential services by
(FY2014) the government, such as public health, education, and public
safety.
Public Goods Negative Not paying taxes puts at risk the provision of essential
(FY2014, 2015) services by the government, such as public health, education,
and public safety.
Panel C: Tax Filing
Tax Morale Public Goods The above pie chart illustrates how your taxes and social security
contributions are spent in terms of public services.
Public Goods Negative The above pie chart illustrates how your taxes and social security
contributions are spent in terms of public services. Incorrect and timely
completion of the declaration puts at risk the essential services provided
by the government.
Public Goods + Penalty The above pie chart illustrates how your taxes and social security
contributions are spent in terms of public services. By completing your
declaration correctly and in a timely fashion, you avoid further measures
such as fines and tax increases.
Public Goods + Social Norms The above pie chart illustrates how your taxes and social security
contributions are spent in terms of public services. The vast majority
of people complete their declaration correctly and in a timely manner.
Please follow this example.
Panel D: Filing Reminders
Deterrence Explicit Penalty You risk a penalty of 50 to 1,250 euro and a tax increase of 10
to 200%.
Note: The table lists all letter messages by experiment and treatment type. In all experiments the messages
where added to a personalized simplified letter.
47
T
ab
le
A
.2
:
R
an
d
om
iz
at
io
n
D
es
ig
n
fo
r
T
P
R
,
T
F
an
d
T
F
R
ex
p
er
im
en
ts
(u
si
n
g
n
at
io
n
al
id
en
ti
ty
n
u
m
b
er
)
D
ig
it
s
T
P
R
2
0
1
4
T
F
R
2
0
1
5
T
P
R
2
0
1
5
T
F
2
0
1
6
D
ig
it
s
T
P
R
2
0
1
4
T
F
R
2
0
1
5
T
P
R
2
0
1
5
T
F
2
0
1
6
T
R
E
A
T
M
E
N
T
A
L
L
O
C
A
T
IO
N
0
1
C
C
C
S
+
P
G
5
1
S
+
P
G
S
+
E
P
S
+
P
G
N
+
E
P
C
0
2
C
C
S
S
+
P
G
5
2
S
+
P
G
S
+
E
P
S
+
S
N
C
C
C
o
n
tr
o
l
0
3
C
C
S
+
E
P
S
+
P
G
5
3
S
+
P
G
S
+
E
P
S
+
S
N
+
E
P
C
S
S
im
p
li
fi
c
a
ti
o
n
0
4
C
C
S
+
E
P
F
M
S
+
P
G
5
4
S
+
S
N
+
P
G
S
+
E
P
C
C
D
e
te
r
r
e
n
c
e
M
e
ss
a
g
e
s
0
5
C
C
S
+
E
P
E
N
F
S
+
P
G
5
5
S
+
S
N
+
P
G
S
+
E
P
S
C
E
P
E
x
p
li
ci
t
P
en
a
lt
y
(E
P
)
0
6
C
C
S
+
E
P
IM
M
S
+
P
G
5
6
S
+
S
N
+
P
G
S
+
E
P
S
+
E
P
C
A
C
A
ct
iv
e
C
h
o
ic
e
(A
C
)
0
7
C
C
S
+
P
G
N
S
+
P
G
5
7
S
+
S
N
+
P
G
S
+
E
P
S
+
E
P
F
M
C
E
P
F
M
E
P
(F
em
a
le
N
a
m
e
F
ir
st
)
0
8
C
C
S
+
P
G
N
+
E
P
S
+
P
G
5
8
S
+
S
N
+
P
G
S
+
E
P
S
+
E
P
E
N
F
C
E
P
E
N
F
E
P
+
E
n
fo
rc
em
en
t
0
9
C
C
S
+
S
N
S
+
P
G
5
9
S
+
S
N
+
P
G
S
+
E
P
S
+
E
P
IM
M
C
E
P
IM
M
E
P
+
Im
m
ed
ia
cy
1
0
C
C
S
+
S
N
+
E
P
S
+
P
G
6
0
S
+
S
N
+
P
G
S
+
E
P
S
+
P
G
N
C
T
a
x
M
o
r
a
le
T
r
e
a
tm
e
n
ts
1
1
C
S
C
S
+
P
G
6
1
S
+
S
N
+
P
G
S
+
E
P
S
+
P
G
N
+
E
P
C
P
G
P
u
b
li
c
G
o
o
d
s
(P
G
)
1
2
S
S
C
S
+
P
G
6
2
S
+
S
N
+
P
G
S
+
E
P
S
+
S
N
C
P
G
N
P
G
N
eg
a
ti
v
e
(P
G
N
)
1
3
S
S
S
S
+
P
G
N
6
3
S
+
S
N
+
P
G
S
+
E
P
S
+
S
N
+
E
P
C
S
N
S
o
ci
a
l
N
o
rm
s
(S
N
)
1
4
S
S
S
+
E
P
S
+
P
G
N
6
4
S
+
S
N
+
P
G
S
+
E
P
S
+
P
G
N
C
1
5
S
S
S
+
E
P
F
M
S
+
P
G
N
6
5
S
+
A
C
S
+
E
P
C
C
1
6
S
S
S
+
E
P
E
N
F
S
+
P
G
N
6
6
S
+
A
C
S
+
E
P
S
C
1
7
S
S
S
+
E
P
IM
M
S
+
P
G
N
6
7
S
+
A
C
S
+
E
P
S
+
E
P
C
1
8
S
S
S
+
P
G
N
S
+
P
G
N
6
8
S
+
A
C
S
+
E
P
S
+
E
P
F
M
C
1
9
S
S
S
+
P
G
N
+
E
P
S
+
P
G
N
6
9
S
+
A
C
S
+
E
P
S
+
E
P
E
N
F
C
2
0
S
S
S
+
S
N
S
+
P
G
N
7
0
S
+
A
C
S
+
E
P
S
+
E
P
IM
M
C
2
1
S
S
S
+
S
N
+
E
P
S
+
P
G
N
7
1
S
+
A
C
S
+
E
P
S
+
P
G
N
C
2
2
S
S
+
E
P
S
S
+
P
G
N
7
2
S
+
A
C
S
+
E
P
S
+
P
G
N
+
E
P
C
2
3
S
+
S
N
S
+
E
P
C
S
+
P
G
N
7
3
S
+
A
C
S
+
E
P
S
+
S
N
C
2
4
S
+
S
N
S
+
E
P
S
S
+
P
G
N
7
4
S
+
A
C
S
+
E
P
S
+
S
N
+
E
P
C
2
5
S
+
S
N
S
+
E
P
S
+
E
P
S
+
P
G
+
S
N
7
5
S
+
A
C
S
+
E
P
S
+
E
P
C
2
6
S
+
S
N
S
+
E
P
S
+
E
P
F
M
S
+
P
G
+
S
N
7
6
S
+
E
P
S
+
E
P
C
C
2
7
S
+
S
N
S
+
E
P
S
+
E
P
E
N
F
S
+
P
G
+
S
N
7
7
S
+
E
P
S
+
E
P
S
C
2
8
S
+
S
N
S
+
E
P
S
+
E
P
IM
M
S
+
P
G
+
S
N
7
8
S
+
E
P
S
+
E
P
S
+
E
P
C
2
9
S
+
S
N
S
+
E
P
S
+
P
G
N
S
+
P
G
+
S
N
7
9
S
+
E
P
S
+
E
P
S
+
E
P
F
M
C
3
0
S
+
S
N
S
+
E
P
S
+
P
G
N
+
E
P
S
+
P
G
+
S
N
8
0
S
+
E
P
S
+
E
P
S
+
E
P
E
N
F
C
3
1
S
+
S
N
S
+
E
P
S
+
S
N
S
+
P
G
+
S
N
8
1
S
+
E
P
S
+
E
P
S
+
E
P
IM
M
C
3
2
S
+
S
N
S
+
E
P
S
+
S
N
+
E
P
S
+
P
G
+
S
N
8
2
S
+
E
P
S
+
E
P
S
+
P
G
N
C
3
3
S
+
S
N
S
+
E
P
S
+
S
N
S
+
P
G
+
S
N
8
3
S
+
E
P
S
+
E
P
S
+
P
G
N
+
E
P
C
3
4
S
+
P
G
N
S
+
E
P
C
S
+
P
G
+
S
N
8
4
S
+
E
P
S
+
E
P
S
+
S
N
C
3
5
S
+
P
G
N
S
+
E
P
S
S
+
P
G
+
S
N
8
5
S
+
E
P
S
+
E
P
S
+
S
N
+
E
P
C
3
6
S
+
P
G
N
S
+
E
P
S
+
E
P
S
+
P
G
+
S
N
8
6
S
+
A
C
+
E
P
S
+
E
P
S
+
E
P
C
3
7
S
+
P
G
N
S
+
E
P
S
+
E
P
F
M
S
+
P
G
+
E
P
8
7
S
+
A
C
+
E
P
S
+
E
P
C
C
3
8
S
+
P
G
N
S
+
E
P
S
+
E
P
E
N
F
S
+
P
G
+
E
P
8
8
S
+
A
C
+
E
P
S
+
E
P
S
C
3
9
S
+
P
G
N
S
+
E
P
S
+
E
P
IM
M
S
+
P
G
+
E
P
8
9
S
+
A
C
+
E
P
S
+
E
P
S
+
E
P
C
4
0
S
+
P
G
N
S
+
E
P
S
+
P
G
N
S
+
P
G
+
E
P
9
0
S
+
A
C
+
E
P
S
+
E
P
S
+
E
P
F
M
C
4
1
S
+
P
G
N
S
+
E
P
S
+
P
G
N
+
E
P
S
+
P
G
+
E
P
9
1
S
+
A
C
+
E
P
S
+
E
P
S
+
E
P
E
N
F
C
4
2
S
+
P
G
N
S
+
E
P
S
+
S
N
S
+
P
G
+
E
P
9
2
S
+
A
C
+
E
P
S
+
E
P
S
+
E
P
IM
M
C
4
3
S
+
P
G
N
S
+
E
P
S
+
S
N
+
E
P
S
+
P
G
+
E
P
9
3
S
+
A
C
+
E
P
S
+
E
P
S
+
P
G
N
C
4
4
S
+
P
G
S
+
E
P
C
S
+
P
G
+
E
P
9
4
S
+
A
C
+
E
P
S
+
E
P
S
+
P
G
N
+
E
P
C
4
5
S
+
P
G
S
+
E
P
S
S
+
P
G
+
E
P
9
5
S
+
A
C
+
E
P
S
+
E
P
S
+
S
N
C
4
6
S
+
P
G
S
+
E
P
S
+
E
P
S
+
P
G
+
E
P
9
6
S
+
A
C
+
E
P
S
+
E
P
S
+
S
N
+
E
P
C
4
7
S
+
P
G
S
+
E
P
S
+
E
P
F
M
S
+
P
G
+
E
P
9
7
S
+
A
C
+
E
P
S
+
E
P
S
+
E
P
C
4
8
S
+
P
G
S
+
E
P
S
+
E
P
E
N
F
S
+
P
G
+
E
P
4
9
S
+
P
G
S
+
E
P
S
+
E
P
IM
M
C
5
0
S
+
P
G
S
+
E
P
S
+
P
G
N
C
N
ot
e:
T
h
e
ta
b
le
p
re
se
n
ts
th
e
ra
n
d
om
iz
at
io
n
d
es
ig
n
o
f
fo
u
r
se
p
a
ra
te
ex
p
er
im
en
ts
.
T
P
R
st
a
n
d
s
fo
r
p
ay
m
en
t
re
m
in
d
er
s,
T
F
R
fo
r
fi
li
n
g
re
m
in
d
er
s
a
n
d
T
F
to
ta
x
fi
li
n
g
ex
p
er
im
en
t.
2-
d
ig
it
s
ar
e
th
e
la
st
tw
o
d
ig
it
s
o
f
th
e
n
a
ti
o
n
a
l
id
en
ti
ty
n
u
m
b
er
.
S
ee
A
p
p
en
d
ix
T
a
b
le
A
.1
fo
r
m
o
re
d
et
a
il
s
o
n
tr
ea
tm
en
t
m
es
sa
ge
s.
A
ll
m
es
sa
ge
s
w
er
e
ad
d
ed
to
p
er
so
n
al
iz
ed
si
m
p
li
fi
ed
le
tt
er
s.
48
Table A.3: Randomization Design for TP experiment (using Day of Birth)
Day TP Day TP Treatment Groups
01 C 17 S + PG
02 C 18 S + PG C Control
03 C 19 S + PG S Simplification
04 C 20 S + PG S (NP) Simplification (Not Personalized)
05 S (NP) 21 S + ENF+ IMM Deterrence Messages
06 S (NP) 22 S + ENF+ IMM S + EP Explicit Penalty
07 S (NP) 23 S + ENF+ IMM S + ENF+ IMM Enforcement+Immediacy
08 S (NP) 24 S + ENF+ IMM Tax Morale Messages
09 S + EP 25 S S + PG Public Goods
10 S + EP 26 S S + SN Social Norms
11 S + EP 27 S
12 S + EP 28 S
13 S + SN 29 S
14 S + SN 30 S
15 S + SN 31 S
16 S + SN
Note: The table presents the randomization design of the Tax Payment (TP) experiment. Day stands for
the day the taxpayer was born. Simplified letters that were not personalized started with “Mr., Ms.” instead
of “Mr X” or “Ms X” (where X is the name of the taxpayer). See Appendix Table A.1 for more details on
treatment messages. All messages were added to personalized simplified letters.
Table A.4: Overlap across experiments
Share of taxpayers in experiment
Payment Reminders Payment Reminders Filing Reminders
FY2014 FY2015 FY2015
Experiment (1) (2) (3)
Payment Reminders FY2014 1.000 0.283 0.062
Payment Reminders FY2015 0.307 1.000 0.066
Filing Reminders FY2015 0.106 0.104 1.000
Note: The table presents the overlap between populations of taxpayers in the payment reminders (TPR)
and filing reminders experiments (TFR). Each cell gives the share of taxpayers in the experiment listed
horizontally that were also part of the population of the experiment listed vertically.
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Table A.5: Filing Reminders FY2015 control-
ling for TPR FY2014 treatment assignment
Probability of having filed
21 days (before enforcement)
(1)
Simplified (S) 0.019
(0.011)
+ Deterrence 0.029
(0.010)
P-values of tests:
Simplified=Control 0.072
S+Deterrence=Simplified 0.005
Control mean 0.317
N 148,925
Note: The table presents treatment effect estimates
from filing reminders experiment (TFR FY2015).
Control variables are listed in Table 1. Additional con-
trols include dummies for the treatment the taxpayer
would have received if had been late with payment
in the previous fiscal year. Robust standard errors in
parentheses.
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Table A.6: Payment Experiments: Individual Letter Effects
Probability of some payment at 14 days (before enforcement) at 60 days (deadline)
TPR FY2014 TPR FY2015 TP
(1) (2) (3)
Simplification Treatments
Simplified (S) 0.102 0.107 0.005
(0.010) (0.004) (0.002)
+ Not Personalized (NP) 0.001
(0.002)
Deterrence Treatments
+ Explicit Penalty (EP) 0.020 0.009 0.004
(0.002) (0.003) (0.001)
+ Active Choice (AC) 0.001
(0.004)
+ EP + AC 0.016
(0.005)
+ EP + Enforcement 0.024
(0.003)
+ EP + Immediacy 0.017
(0.004)
+ EP FM 0.008
(0.005)
+ Enforcement + Immediacy 0.007
(0.001)
Tax Morale Treatments
+ Public Goods Negative (PGN) -0.007 -0.014
(0.004) (0.003)
+ Public Goods Positive (PGP) -0.014 -0.002
(0.004) (0.001)
+ Social Norms (SN) -0.002 -0.011 0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.001)
+ SN + PGP -0.006
(0.004)
Deterrence & Tax Morale Treatments
+ EP + SN 0.006
(0.003)
+ EP + PGN 0.005
(0.005)
P-values of tests:
Simplified=Control 0.001 0.001 0.001
S + NP = S 0.498
S + EP = S 0.001 0.451 0.017
S + AC = S 0.859
S + EP + AC = S + EP 0.491
S + EP + Enforcement = S + EP 0.001
S + EP + Immediacy = S + EP 0.077
S + EP FM = S + EP 0.916
S + Enforcement + Immediacy = S 0.001
S + PGN = S 0.61 0.001
S + PGP = S 0.007 0.262
S + SN = S 0.92 0.375 0.651
S + SN + PGP = S 0.562
S + EP + SN = S + EP 0.956
S + EP + PGN = S + EP 0.991
Control mean 0.447 0.418 0.728
N 229,751 202,730 1,216,317
Note: The table presents treatment effect estimates of messages in the two payment reminder experiments
(TPR 2014 in column 1 and TPR 2015 in column 2) and in the tax payment (TP) experiment (column 3).
Control variables are listed in Table 1. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by date of letter receipt.
p-values adjusted for multiple hypothesis testing (List et al., 2016).
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Table A.7: Treatment Effects on Other Outcomes
Panel A: Tax Payment TPR 2014 TPR 2015 TP
% Liability Paid % Liability Paid % Liability Paid
before Enforcement before Enforcement before Deadline
(1) (2) (3)
Simplified (S) 0.003 0.011 0.002
(0.002) (0.004) (0.001)
+ Deterrence 0.002 0.002 -0.000
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
+ Tax Morale 0.000 -0.001 -0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
+ Deterrence + Tax Morale 0.003
(0.002)
P-values of tests:
Simplified=Control 0.124 0.120 0.001
S+Deterrence=Simplified 0.318 0.987 0.827
S+Tax Morale=Simplified 0.416 0.472 0.708
S+Deterrence+Tax Morale=S+Deterrence 0.715
Control mean 0.915 0.900 0.941
N 124,032 105,934 892,310
Panel B: Tax Filing Log pre-check total Log self-employed Log self-employed
tax due profits expenses
(1) (2) (3)
Tax Morale -0.003 0.010 -0.014
(0.003) (0.016) (0.014)
P-values of test:
Tax Morale=Control 0.584 0.750 0.776
Control mean 13.446 12.767 12.940
N 850,778 64,606 44,919
Panel B (continued) Log salaried Log general
expenses expenses
(4) (5)
Tax Morale -0.004 -0.006
(0.006) (0.005)
P-values of test:
Tax Morale=Control 0.844 0.526
Control mean 13.155 11.082
N 39,176 290,551
Note: The table presents treatment effect estimates for other outcomes of interest in the tax payment (TP
FY2016 Panel A) and the tax filing (TF FY2016 Panel B) experiments. In Panel A the sample consists of
late payers who had made some payment before enforcement started. Control variables are listed in Table 1.
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by date of letter receipt in Panel A. p-values adjusted for
multiple hypothesis testing (List et al., 2016).
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Table A.9: Heterogeneous Effects – Payment Reminder Experiment FY2014
Probability of payment before enforcement
Simplified (S) 0.041
(0.040)
+ Deterrence 0.080 (continued)
(0.030)
+ Tax Morale 0.090 Solvency score Q3 * Simplified 0.056
(0.025) (0.014)
Age 31-40 * Simplified 0.012 * S + Deterrence -0.004
(0.013) (0.008)
* S + Deterrence -0.011 * S + Tax Morale -0.004
(0.012) (0.011)
* S + Tax Morale -0.006 Solvency score Q4 * Simplified 0.024
(0.010) (0.016)
Age 41-50 * Simplified 0.025 * S + Deterrence -0.016
(0.014) (0.013)
* S + Deterrence -0.026 * S + Tax Morale -0.001
(0.012) (0.015)
* S + Tax Morale -0.026 Solvency score Q5 * Simplified -0.030
(0.011) (0.021)
Age 51-60 * Simplified 0.011 * S + Deterrence -0.002
(0.013) (0.011)
* S + Deterrence -0.028 * S + Tax Morale 0.012
(0.010) (0.011)
* S + Tax Morale -0.028 Liability Q2 * Simplified -0.050
(0.010) (0.012)
Age 61+ * Simplified -0.017 * S + Deterrence -0.005
(0.013) (0.010)
* S + Deterrence -0.024 * S + Tax Morale 0.017
(0.013) (0.011)
* S + Tax Morale -0.016 Liability Q3 * Simplified -0.042
(0.008) (0.010)
One child * Simplified 0.019 * S + Deterrence -0.019
(0.013) (0.007)
* S + Deterrence 0.008 * S + Tax Morale 0.004
(0.010) (0.007)
* S + Tax Morale 0.013 Liability Q4 * Simplified -0.062
(0.012) (0.010)
Two or more children * Simplified 0.027 * S + Deterrence -0.016
(0.014) (0.010)
* S + Deterrence -0.011 * S + Tax Morale 0.016
(0.012) (0.010)
* S + Tax Morale -0.012 Liability Q5 * Simplified -0.046
(0.011) (0.011)
Solvency score Q2 * Simplified 0.059 * S + Deterrence -0.041
(0.011) (0.008)
* S + Deterrence -0.008 * S + Tax Morale 0.007
(0.007) (0.010)
* S + Tax Morale -0.013
(0.005) N 229,751
Note: The table presents the heterogeneous treatment effects of the TPR FY2015 experiment. Control
variables are listed in Table 1. The full set of interactions between individual control and treatment variables
are included in the estimation (coefficients not reported). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by
date of letter receipt. 54
Table A.10: Heterogeneous Effects – Payment Reminders Experiment FY2015
Probability of payment before enforcement
Simplified (S) 0.079
(0.066)
+ Deterrence 0.042 (continued)
(0.047)
+ Tax Morale -0.002 Solvency score Q3 * Simplified -0.018
(0.058) (0.013)
Age 31-40 * Simplified -0.017 * S + Deterrence -0.021
(0.013) (0.013)
* S + Deterrence 0.031 * S + Tax Morale -0.027
(0.016) (0.013)
* S + Tax Morale 0.008 Solvency score Q4 * Simplified -0.002
(0.012) (0.021)
Age 41-50 * Simplified -0.002 * S + Deterrence 0.001
(0.013) (0.010)
* S + Deterrence -0.015 * S + Tax Morale 0.016
(0.009) (0.012)
* S + Tax Morale 0.008 Solvency score Q5 * Simplified 0.109
(0.013) (0.011)
Age 51-60 * Simplified -0.011 * S + Deterrence 0.055
(0.012) (0.024)
* S + Deterrence -0.012 * S + Tax Morale -0.001
(0.010) (0.017)
* S + Tax Morale 0.005 Liability Q2 * Simplified 0.037
(0.009) (0.015)
Age 61+ * Simplified -0.004 * S + Deterrence 0.001
(0.010) (0.017)
* S + Deterrence -0.007 * S + Tax Morale -0.015
(0.015) (0.012)
* S + Tax Morale -0.006 Liability Q3 * Simplified -0.021
(0.013) (0.008)
One child * Simplified -0.015 * S + Deterrence 0.047
(0.020) (0.013)
* S + Deterrence -0.007 * S + Tax Morale 0.009
(0.017) (0.015)
* S + Tax Morale -0.014 Liability Q4 * Simplified -0.009
(0.019) (0.009)
Two or more children * Simplified 0.070 * S + Deterrence -0.009
(0.010) (0.009)
* S + Deterrence -0.033 * S + Tax Morale 0.088
(0.013) (0.016)
* S + Tax Morale -0.008 Liability Q5 * Simplified 0.012
(0.015) (0.013)
Solvency score Q2 * Simplified 0.020 * S + Deterrence 0.005
(0.014) (0.012)
* S + Deterrence -0.001 * S + Tax Morale 0.009
(0.011) (0.012)
* S + Tax Morale -0.026
(0.010) N 0.089
Note: The table presents the heterogeneous treatment effects of the TPR FY2015 experiment. Control
variables are listed in Table 1. The full set of interactions between individual control and treatment variables
are included in the estimation (coefficients not reported). Estimates for Deterrence and Tax Morale joint
treatment omitted for brevity. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by date of letter receipt.55
Table A.11: Number of Follow-up Enforcements FY2014
Nr registered letters Nr garnishments Nr bailiffs
within 180 days within 180 days within 180 days
(1) (2) (3)
Simplified -0.074 -0.028 -0.012
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Control mean 0.350 0.134 0.078
N 229,751 229,751 229,751
Note: The table presents treatment effect estimates on the number of enforcement actions by type from the
payment reminders experiment (TPR FY2014). Control variables are listed in Table 1. Standard errors in
parentheses are clustered by date of letter receipt.
Table A.12: RDD: Number of Follow-up Enforcements FY2014
Nr registered letters Nr garnishments Nr bailiffs
within 180 days within 180 days within 180 days
(1) (2) (3)
Simplified -0.070 -0.019 0.002
(0.018) (0.015) (0.003)
Enforcement 0.110 0.071 0.000
(0.025) (0.021) (0.004)
Simplified*Enforcement -0.057 -0.032 -0.000
(0.027) (0.022) (0.005)
Control mean 0.159 0.061 0.002
N 25,855 20,338 30,348
Note: The table presents treatment effect estimates from the regression discontinuity design analysis em-
bedded in the payment reminder experiment (TPR FY2014). Simplified is a dummy variable equal to one
for taxpayers who received a simplified letter. Enforcement is a dummy variable equal to one for liability
amounts above the cut-off value. Control variables are listed in Table 1. Standard errors in parentheses are
clustered by date of letter receipt.
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Table A.13: Replication of TPR experiment in FY2015
Probability of some payment
at 14 days (before enforcement)
Simplified (S) 0.107
(0.004)
+ Deterrence 0.014
(0.003)
+ Tax Morale -0.012
(0.003)
+ Deterrence & Tax Morale 0.006
(0.003)
P-values of tests:
Simplified=Control 0.001
S + Deterrence=Simplified 0.001
S + Tax Morale=Simplified 0.007
S + Deterrence + Tax Morale= S + Deterrence 0.011
Control mean 0.418
N 202,730
Note: The table presents results from the FY2015 TPR experiment, which replicated the FY2014 TPR
experiment. The sample is the universe of late payers in FY2015. Control variables are listed in Table 1.
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by date of letter receipt. p-values adjusted for multiple hypoth-
esis testing (List et al., 2016).
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Table A.14: Repeated Treatment Effects
Probability of some payment
14 days / follow-up
Sample of Taxpayers Sample of Taxpayers
late in FY2014 late in FY2014 and FY2015
(2) (1)
Simplified 2014 (S 2014) 0.001 0.011
(0.008) (0.012)
+ Deterrence 2014 (D 2014) -0.002 -0.010
(0.007) (0.010)
+ Tax Morale 2014 (TM 2014) -0.003 -0.016
(0.008) (0.018)
Simplified 2015 (S 2015) 0.025 0.107
(0.009) (0.013)
+ Deterrence 2015 (D 2015) 0.001 0.005
(0.004) (0.012)
+ Tax Morale 2015 (TM 2015) -0.004 -0.024
(0.004) (0.007)
S 2014 * S 2015 0.005 -0.020
(0.010) (0.015)
S 2014 * S + D 2015 -0.002 -0.011
(0.005) (0.017)
S 2014 * S + TM 2015 0.004 0.025
(0.004) (0.015)
S + D 2014 * S 2015 0.000 0.016
(0.009) (0.014)
S + D 2014 * S + D 2015 0.002 0.010
(0.005) (0.011)
S + D 2014 * S + TM 2015 -0.002 -0.021
(0.003) (0.014)
S + TM 2014 * S 2015 -0.007 0.005
(0.009) (0.021)
S + TM 2014 * S + D 2015 0.007 0.027
(0.005) (0.011)
S + TM 2014 * S + TM 2015 -0.002 -0.010
(0.002) (0.007)
P-values of tests:
S 2014 = Control 0.824 0.971
S 2015 = Control 0.308 0.001
S 2014 * S 2015 = S 2015 0.823 0.992
S + D 2014 = S 2014 0.947 0.945
S + D 2015 = S 2015 0.907 0.996
S + D 2014 * S + D 2015 = S 2014 * S + D 2015 0.986 0.582
S + TM 2014 = S 2014 0.976 0.751
S + TM 2015 = S 2015 0.993 0.948
S + TM 2014 * S + TM 2015 = S 2014 * S + TM 2015 0.165 0.959
Control mean 0.825 0.410
N 229,751 66,705
Note: The table present treatment effect estimates for repeated treatment in the payment reminders exper-
iment. Sample size is limited to individuals who were late with payment in both FY2014 and FY2015. For
FY2015 treatment assignment both dummies for Deterrence and Tax Morale equal one for individuals who
received a letter with both a deterrence and tax morale message. Control variables are listed in Table 1.
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by date of letter receipt.
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Letter A.7: Tax morale treatment in filing process
Social Protection 
(Sickness and 
disability; old age; 
family and children; 
unemployment, …) 
37,5%
Public Debt Transactions 5,7%
Defence 1,6%
Public order and safety 3,3%
Recreation, culture and relegion 2,2%
Environmental protection 1,6%
Housing and community amenities 0,6%
Economic affairs 12,0%
Health 14,2%
Education 11,9%
General Public Services (General services, foreign economic aid, 
basic research, ...) 9,4%
11
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
How are your taxes and social contributions spent?
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Letter A.8: Online Filers Survey
The answers to the following 10 questions are treated independently on an anonymous basis
and are not linked to individual declarations.
1. On a scale of 1 to 10, to what extent do you find it easy to submit your tax return via
Tax-on-Web?
2. On a scale of 1 to 10, how satisfied are you with the content and functions of Tax-On-
Web?
3. On a scale of 1 to 10, how would you recommend Tax-On-Web to friend (s) or colleague
(s)?
4. On a scale of 1 to 10, to what extent are you satisfied with the general tax system?
5. On a scale of 1 to 10, to what extent do you value the public services where (your) tax
money is used for?
6. On a scale of 1 to 10, to what extent do you agree with the way your tax money is
currently being spent?
7. On a scale of 1 to 10, to what extent do you think citizens should be completely honest
when completing their tax return?
8. On a scale of 1 to 10, to what extent do you have a good idea of where your tax money
goes?
9. Please add the following budget categories with the percentage of tax payable to you
to these public services (total = 100%):
 General government management (public debt, public services, basic research,
foreign economic assistance, etc.)
 Defence
 Public order and safety
 Economics
 Environmental protection
 Housing and common facilities
 Recreation, culture and religion
 Education
 Health
 Social protection (elderly, sickness and disability, family and children, unemploy-
ment, ...)
10. If you had the opportunity to give your preference in terms of budget priorities, in
which order would you spend the following categories on your tax money? Please
place numbers from 1 (highest priority) to 10 (lowest priority) next to the following
categories: (same as above)
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